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ABSTRACT 
 The 1990s saw important developments in the employment practices of 
Japanese women as necessitated by economic recession. Japanese women are 
increasingly postponing their traditional roles of wife and mother in lieu of expanding 
education and employment opportunities, suggesting that we are approaching or 
witnessing a period of redefinition of the prevailing gender structure.  
 
This thesis offers a theoretical exposition of this “crisis” in the gender 
structure utilising Connell’s concept of “hegemonic masculinity” and Finnemore and 
Sikkink’s “norm life cycle model”. This thesis will be presented as follows: i) 
hegemonic masculinity will be applied to the Japanese context to argue for the 
centrality of masculinity defined through the corporation, and for its significance in an 
understanding of femininity; ii) discussion of the “feminisation” of part-time work in 
Japan will test whether a challenge to the gender order from within of this nature 
represents a profound redefinition of the hegemonic gender structure; and iii) 
discursive study of Japanese state legislation and policy will reveal government 
commitment to ensuring continuity in gender norm dynamics.  
 
The findings suggest that we are not witnessing a period of “crisis” or 
profound transformation in the gender structure for greater gender equality. The 
pervasiveness of gender norm ideology in Japan is such that once established these 
norms have maintained an internal momentum so that changes in the material sphere 
are constrained by these ideational structures and not vice versa. The current period is 
marked by cooptation of gender norm challenges by corporations and government in 
an effort to neutralise gender norm challenge.  
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Introduction 
 
 
Gender Order or Gender Regime is a concept that defines the pattern of 
gender arrangements in any specific social structure, in any given period (Connell 
2002, pp.53-55). The prevailing gender regime in a given context is the result of 
contestation over hegemonic ideals of masculinity and complimentary ideals of 
femininity which provide the normative standard to which the sexes behave within 
their appropriate gender identities. The historically prevailing gender regime in Japan 
is characterised by patriarchy, as exemplified by the traditional social institution of the 
ie family unit. The ie system of the Meiji era is modelled on the patrilineal family 
system of the samurai household, with a male head and each family member 
considered to be directly subordinate to the emperor (see Hsia and Scanzoni 1996; and 
Smith 1987). However, the waning of the economic miracle and end of the double-
digit growth era in the early 1990s has brought changes in the traditional structure of 
the gender regime in Japan – increased unemployment, decline in fertility rates, 
decreased rate of marriage, increased participation of women in the labour force, and 
increased educational attainment for women – which indicates that we are seemingly 
witnessing a period of redefinition for the prevailing gender order. It is the goal of this 
thesis to investigate these changes to the current gender structure in contemporary 
Japan in order to illuminate whether we are witnessing a period of “crisis” or 
profound transformation in the gender structure and to offer an understanding of what 
this change means for the current nature of gender relations in Japan.  
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 Tremendous changes have taken place in women’s employment in Japan. The 
bursting of the bubble economy in the 1990s, with labour shortages and increases in 
the average cost of living, necessitated that women remain in part-time employment 
after marriage to supplement the household income, whilst for the first time Japanese 
men were seeing a reduced emphasis on the guarantee of lifetime employment as 
evident by rising levels of unemployment. In the 1980s, Japan’s rate of 
unemployment moved within the band of 2 percent and 2.8 percent. This figure 
increased to 2.2 percent in 1990 to reach the record level of 5.5 percent in 2002. 
Moreover, whilst the female unemployment rate has historically exceeded that of the 
male rate of unemployment, this trend was reversed in 1996 when the male 
unemployment rate began to outstrip that of women. In 2003, the male unemployment 
rate stood at 5.5 percent compared to 4.9 percent for women (Osawa 2004-05, pp.100-
101). Women’s labour force participation rate has also now reached approximately 40 
percent of the total paid labour force (Kumamoto-Healey 2005, p.457). Moreover, 
whilst the wage ratio between men and women has historically and currently remains 
in favour of men, there has been a narrowing of the gender wage gap which figured at 
60.2 percent in 1990 and improved to 66.8 percent in 2003 (Osawa 2004-05, p.102).  
 
 In addition to changes in women’s employment, there has also been an 
expansion in the educational attainment of Japanese women. The university enrolment 
rate for women has increased over the last decade from 15 percent in 1990 (compared 
to 33.4 percent for men) to reach 33.8 percent by 2002 (compared to 47 percent for 
men) (Osawa 2004-05, p.97). Also, as of 1990, 37.4 percent of girls advanced from 
High School to enrol in Junior Colleges or University (compared to 35.2 percent of 
boys) (Tsuya and Oppenheim Mason 1995, p.149). This would suggest that women’s 
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labour market improvements have in part resulted from their broadening education 
attainment.  
 
 Scholars have noted that expanding education and employment opportunities 
for women is partially explanatory of Japan’s fertility crisis (see Rindfuss et. al. 2004; 
Kosaka 1994; and Davis 1984). Japan’s birthrate has now declined to the below 
replacement level of 1.34 births per woman (see Dyer 2005; and Lunn 2000). In 
addition, there are suggestions that there is a positive correlation between fertility 
decline in Japan to below-replacement levels since the mid-1970s, and the 
postponement, or indeed, avoidance of marriage and hence childrearing.  Japan has an 
extremely low illegitimate birthrate of approximately 1 percent of all births (Tsuya 
and Oppenheim Mason 1995, p.147), which suggests that the overall decline in 
childbirth is due to the postponement of the age at marriage. The mean age at 
marriage for women has historically remained stable at 25 (Condon 1985, p.18), but 
increased to 27 in 1990 (Tsuya and Oppenheim Mason 1995, p.147). In 2006, the 
mean age at marriage for women had reached 28.2 years of age (Japan Statistics 
Bureau 2007). Hence, due to increased economic opportunities to remain in paid 
employment arising out of expanding education levels, Japanese women have 
consciously delayed marital and childbirth responsibilities in rejection of traditional 
family roles. Indeed, this denouncement of familial roles on the part of Japanese 
women may be conceived as a direct challenge to the nuclear family ideal of the ie 
system, with the daikokubashira “salaryman’ head – a male breadwinner with his two 
children and full time ryosai kenbo (“good wife, wise mother”) counterpart – which 
was promoted and cemented from the post World War II period to the early 1980s 
(see Hsia and Scanzoni 1996). 
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Distinct changes in the economic milieu caused by the end of the economic 
miracle and advent of the post-industrial era, have resulted in challenges (of which the 
above trends are symptomatic) that indicate that the prevailing patriarchal gender 
regime in contemporary Japan is nearing “crisis” point. Women have the opportunity 
to re-draw the balance of power between the sexes. It is due to this set of factors 
unique to the Japanese case at this point in time, that I argue for scholarly attention on 
Japan as the best case study in discussing hegemonic gender relations, and gender 
order dynamics with recourse to the below question: 
 
How Have Practices in Women’s Work Redefined the Nature of the 
Gender Regime in Contemporary Japan? 
 
The remainder of this thesis is therefore concerned with investigating how the current 
state of the gender order in contemporary Japan was and is defined; what the role of 
women and work is in a “redefinition” of the gender structure; and how stakeholders 
in that structure including business and the state have responded to the challenges of 
the 1990s in their management of the gender order. It is hoped that an accurate 
account of the gender order crisis can be offered through examining the structural 
constraints and individual agency, in conjunction with normative gender 
considerations.  
 
 In support of such a theoretical discussion this thesis will be presented as 
follows: chapter one will canvass the existing literature on gender discourse and 
gender relations in Japan to arrive at a conceptual framework informed by a social 
theory of gender; chapter two will build a methodology for examining gender order 
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developments vis-à-vis a constructivist feminist approach that will offer a criteria to 
chart the development and decline of hegemonic gender norms relevant for a 
discussion on hegemonic gender regimes; chapter three will implement the hegemonic 
gender norm model to the Japanese case with a preliminary treatment of the nature of 
the prevailing gender order in Japan before being able to deduce how it has been 
transformed (if indeed this is the case); chapter four will investigate the tremendous 
growth in part-time employment for women since the 1990s and relate this change to 
the prevailing gender norm standard; and chapter five will examine the Japanese 
government’s response to the feminisation of part time work to reveal the nature of 
state commitment to gender norm dynamics and its role in managing the gender order 
challenge.   
 
 In order to substantiate theoretical development and conceptual reasoning of 
the above trajectory, I will draw upon primary data including government policy and 
legislation, as well as quantitative evidence obtained from official government 
statistics and other non-government labour market figures. Data of this nature allows 
for a balance between providing a breadth of understanding of the broader trends and 
developments in the Japanese context, which is helpful in discussing the nature of 
“crisis” in the gender structure, as well as a depth of discussion of the nuanced 
political machinations underpinning such developments. However, it must be stated 
that my absence of understanding for the Japanese language hindered access to more 
current government statistics (especially post 1999).  In addition, official Japanese 
government statistics have been criticised for their propaganda-like nature which 
obscures the accuracy of such data. For example, the White Paper on Gender Equality 
series papers, which is released annually by the Prime Minister Cabinet Office, 
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includes only cursory data that gives the impression that Japan has achieved greater 
gender equality in line with its commitments towards the Vision of Gender Equality. 
However, the White Paper on Gender Equality papers do not provide data on working 
hours within employment types, which would reveal the auxiliary nature of women’s 
work in part-time employment. Thus, the perception maintained by the White Paper 
on Gender Equality papers is that women have increased access to employment, and 
are engaged with part-time labour which is more complementary to the realities of 
their domestic responsibilities - progress is gender equality is being achieved. The 
government’s aversion to honne (negative depiction of events) in preference for 
tatemae (which involves a more positive and idealized spin on events), constrains the 
availability of more current data as the government buys the necessary time to create 
such positive inclinations (Woronoff 1997, p.10-15). Nevertheless, when analysed in 
conjunction with other non-government data, official government statistics are still 
valuable in discerning broad macroeconomic trends. 
 
In addition, this thesis does not include any original qualitative data due to 
time and resource constraints. I am not proficient in the Japanese language and as 
such could not undertake a research study including interviews with Japanese women 
in Japan, which would have complemented quantitative and discursive data used, 
especially in discussing changes in values underpinning hegemonic gender norms. As 
such, I acknowledge that an investigation of gender order developments without 
qualitative support of this nature can only ever be a partial understanding. The 
implication is that there is a gap in the literature due to lack of qualitative research 
that is outside the scope of this current thesis.  
 
Lillian Mai 
Women and Work in Contemporary Japan: Deconstructing the “Crisis” of the Gender Order 
 
- 11 -  
 
Chapter 1 
Conceptualising Gender Relations in Contemporary Japan 
 
Existing literature on gender discourse in Japan is inadequate to explain the 
current state of play for gender relations. Dominant ideology concerning masculine 
and feminine identity predicated on sex role theory treats male and female, masculine 
and feminine, as equivalent however separate concepts in the treatment of gender 
politics. This mutually exclusive treatment of gender relations does not allow for an 
accurate account of developments in the gender regime as constructs of male and 
female, masculine and feminine, are relational concepts which cannot be understood 
in isolation from the other (Kimmell 1987). However, masculinity and femininity are 
mutually enforcing concepts, and transformations within one category will have 
recurring affects on the other. A conceptual framework that transcends this binary 
understanding of gender politics and seeks to locate both halves in a relational 
explanatory mechanism is offered and an overall theory of equilibrium in gender 
arrangements is posited. That is, a treatment of femininity on the overall gender order 
must be made with reference to indirect impacts on masculinity.  
 
 
Existing Explanations 
 
 In addressing gender studies discourse in contemporary Japan with respect to 
the recent developments mentioned, past scholars have tended to analyse gender 
relations from either a female or male standpoint through the prism of sex role theory. 
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Sex role theorists maintain that gender relations between men and women are based 
upon social roles that are entrenched in social stereotypes predicated in biological 
differences between male and female (Mitchell 2004; and Nicholson 1994). 
Therefore, because women are generally physically weaker than men, they are best 
suited to domestic duties such as the rearing of children of which they are equipped 
with the necessary reproductive tools whilst men are expected to economically 
support the household unit in the public realm of production in lieu of their physical 
attributes. Sex role theory moves away from biologically determinist accounts of the 
ways in which men exercise power over women by virtue of their biologically given 
physical attributes, or “the form of political right that all men exercise by virtue of 
being men” (Allen 1996, p.24), to a greater appreciation for the social forces that 
constitute and inform contextually bound gender structures.  
 
From the female standpoint, existing theory on gender discourse in Japan has 
tended to focus on the effect that changes in the economic milieu has had upon the 
changing role of women vis-à-vis the ryosai kenbo ideal. This conceptual framework 
generally seeks to analyse the progress of the women’s movement by measuring how 
far women have progressed from the ryosai kenbo ideology, which considers it natural 
and virtuous for a woman to obey her father in youth, her husband in maturity, and 
her son in old age, to arrive at a nuanced understanding of the day-to-day behaviour 
and experiences of Japanese women (see Immamura 1996; Roberts 1994; Iwao 1993; 
Uno 1993; Smith 1987; Condon 1985; and Lebra 1984). In addition, authors have also 
sought to analyse changes in the role of Japanese women through discussions of their 
labour market experiences (see Broadbent & Morris-Suzuki 2000; Gottfreid & 
Hayashi-Kato 1998; Kosaka 1994; Davis 1984; and Osako 1978). The central concern 
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for such scholars is how the ryosai kenbo ideology constrains women’s public persona 
through the need to balance work/life responsibilities in order to uphold their ryosai 
kenbo duties (men are exempt from such social expectations to engage in domestic 
duties, and hence can more freely pursue non-familial related goals).  
 
Due to the narrow focus on the ryosai kenbo ideal as informed by sex role 
theory, existing scholarly discussions have generally been presented in a dichotomous 
frame with most authors incorporating a ‘public versus private’ divide in their 
conceptual framework. For example, the recent study of the feminisation of part-time 
work in Japan, Kaye Broadbent argues that part-time employment is an employer and 
state based strategy to utilise women’s labour as an economic shock absorber, whilst 
not to upset the male breadwinner status quo of the existing gender work contract 
(Broadbent 2003). In this view, Japanese women are seemingly challenging the 
prevailing gender equilibrium by compromising their traditional domestic roles in 
preference for greater economic independence in the workplace. However, in 
accepting part-time employment over full-time employment, Japanese women are in 
fact relinquishing their workplace rights and unknowingly contributing to the further 
entrenchment of their status as second-class citizens in line with ryosai kenbo 
expectations.  Such explanations cannot offer a systematic theorisation of the nature 
of change, as gender relations are re-constituted to uphold the dynamics of the current 
structure. That is, how the prevailing gender balance is historically constructed from 
the changes within gender relations themselves (Demetriou 2001, p.338). 
 
Conversely, the male-focused line of analysis highlights that men are also 
required to fulfil a socially determined gender role, that of the daikokubashira, which 
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complements the ryosai kenbo model (Smith 1987, p.4). Whilst the literature on 
women’s gender roles in Japan are widespread and profuse, studies of male gender 
roles has only emerged in response to the studies on women. In his seminal study, 
“Japan’s New Middle Class: The Salaryman and His Family in a Tokyo Suburb” 
(1967), Vogel presents an ethnographic study to explain the everyday interactions 
between the sexes from a male conceptual viewpoint, from which  subsequent authors 
have been able to build their daikokubashira-informed conceptual frameworks. This 
includes scholars such as Chiba and Osamu (1997) who analysed the relationship 
between lifetime employment for Japanese males and their social standing in society, 
and Dasgupta (2003 and 2005) who discusses the importance of the daikokubashira 
ideal to Japanese male constructions of identity. The aforementioned studies into 
Japanese male gender roles all acknowledge that men’s agency is not constrained 
within a system that was constructed by men to privilege men, as experienced by 
women. Therefore, the aim of role theory analysis from the male perspective is not to 
measure the level of deviation from the existing order as it is in the female-centred 
analysis, but to understand the strategies men use to retain and uphold the structures 
that legitimise, enforce and perpetuate their authority over women. 
 
Role theory derived from the one-dimensional approach that is informed by a 
masculine daikokubashira or feminine ryosai kenbo conception fails to appreciate the 
subtle transformations in the exalted gender structure, even in light of seeming 
continuity. As Kimmel notes, “masculinity and femininity are relational constructs; 
the definition of either depends on the definition of the other” (Kimmell 1987, p.122). 
Sex role theory reduces gender to two mutually exclusive, homogenous and 
complementary categories without acknowledging the multiplicity between and within 
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gender categorisation, and thus cannot truly account for social inequality and power 
(Peterson 2003; Connell 2002, 1995, 1993, 1987; and Kimmell 1987). The inability 
for sex role theory to understand the multiplicity of femininities and masculinities 
arises from its preference for conceptualisation of expected role behaviour over actual 
role enactment (see Clatterbaugh 1998; and West and Zimmerman 1987). That is, 
inconsistent behaviour to the normative standard is labelled as “private 
dissatisfactions” rather than a signal for the myriad deviations within genders. As 
Dasgupta reveals, the daikokubashira archetype is not the empirical reality but a 
standard to which all Japanese men aspire (Dasgupta 2005, p.168; also see Howson 
2006; and Bird 1996). Moreover, this limitation of sex role theory prevents it from 
understanding resistance to power and hence cannot account for a systematic theory 
for change. As Demetriou notes, “[c]hange has always been a major topic in sex role 
literature, but the inability of the theory to grasp power, resistance to power and 
ultimately contradiction between and within genders prevents it from conceptualizing 
change as internally generated within gender relations themselves.” (Demetriou 2001, 
p.339). It is from this major shortcoming in the broad literature on gender discourse 
that Connell develops a conceptual framework to explain the “global dominance of 
men over women” (Connell 1987, p.183). The central concept under consideration in 
Connell’s theory of gender is “hegemonic masculinity,” which will be considered for 
the purposes of this thesis. 
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Transcending Sex Role Theory: The Case for a Social Theory of Gender 
 
According to Connell, at any given point in time in a specific context, there 
are several “cultural ideals” for being male. The model for being male that gains the 
greatest cultural acceptance, and exerts the greatest power over all other less 
privileged forms of being male, can then be considered the “hegemonic” model 
(Connell 1987, p.84). Connell argues that this appropriation for understanding 
masculinity in a “hegemonic” framework cannot be transferable to discussing 
femininities as women lack the social power to construct institutionalised power 
relationships over other women. Moreover, the construction of femininity lacks the 
dominance-submission characteristic that is the defining feature of hegemony analysis 
(Connell 1987, p.187). Thus, under “hegemonic masculinity” men and women, 
masculinities and feminities are subordinated in reference to the exalted archetype.  
 
In order to determine which “masculine” model is archetypal, Connell 
proposes that relations amoung groups of men in a specific context must be analysed 
in a three-tired approach. Firstly, it must be determined which groups dominate. 
Groups that are generally more culturally accepted tend to hold power in the given 
structure. Secondly, we need to determine the degree of complicity to the dominant 
mode in order to test the extent to which social structures are involved with promoting 
and sustaining the particular model. Finally, relationships of authorisation and 
marginalisation help to restate the second approach of analysis by explaining how it is 
that social structures help to maintain the dominant position of some groups of males 
over others (Connell 2005, pp.76-81).  
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Auxiliary to the concept of “hegemonic masculinity” is that of the tendency 
towards crisis. The systematic feature of men to dominate over women, and women to 
historically contest this subordination defines the nature of the patriarchal system 
(Connell 2005; and MacInnes 1998). Hence it is evident that there can be counter-
hegemonic challenges from within the structure, be it from oppressed forms of 
masculinities or femininities, that may be indicative of a movement towards a “crisis” 
point in which new groups are able to “challenge old solutions and construct a new 
hegemony” (Connell 2005, p.77). Given the recent developments in the economic 
sphere in Japan, the task at hand is to determine at which point in that process we are 
currently witnessing.  
 
 
Summary 
 
 It has been argued that a social theory of gender premised on the conceptual 
propositions of hegemonic masculinity developed by Connell is the best prism 
through which gender relations can be discussed. Chief in determining the nature of 
current equilibrium conditions between masculinity and femininity in this analysis is 
the centrality of “ideal” masculinity. From the central tenants of hegemonic 
masculinity theory discussed above, it can be deduced that since hegemonic 
masculine ideals characterise the current pattern of gender arrangements, then any 
changes or challenges to this reference point will possibly result in a redefinition of 
the gender order. The following chapters will be concerned with firstly building a 
model to which this hypothesis can be tested using constructivist tools, and secondly 
offering case studies to explore the empirical reality of this theoretical proposition in 
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the case of Japan. The result is a discussion of the nexus between the ideational sphere 
and material sphere in determining the current nature of gender relations in 
contemporary Japan.  
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Chapter 2  
Gender Politics and Gender Norm Dynamics 
 
 In support of a conceptual framework informed by a social theory of gender 
based on hegemonic masculinity theory, a “feminist constructivist” approach is 
developed. Feminist theory is partnered with the constructivist tool of normative 
analysis to systematically investigate historical developments in the gender regime of 
Japan. This “femininist constructivist” understanding of gender relations is discussed 
using a “gender norm” life cycle model in a three stage process to determine whether 
hegemonic masculine gender relations in Japan is in a period of consolidation, 
acceptance or decline with reference to changing patterns in women’s employment 
practices. Hegemonic masculinity is seen to be in “crisis” if it is in serious challenge 
from counter-hegemonic ideals. The goal is to understand the causal mechanism 
between femininity, masculinity and gender order balance, as well as the 
interrelationship between changes within one gender identity to the overall gender 
structure.  
 
 
Feminism and Constructivism: From an Ontology of Becoming  
 
 Within the realm of the social, indeed political, sciences scholars have 
commented on the rise of a constructivist “ideational turn” since the 1980s (Reus-
Smit 2001, Hopf 1998, and Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). The preoccupation with 
constructivism as a major challenger to the utilitarian understandings of realism and 
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liberalism has been marred by criticism of the constructivist research program, or lack 
thereof (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001, p.392). Moreover, academics have also noted 
constructivist’s aversion to providing a systematic theory of power which cannot 
account for causality and explain political change (Locher and Prugl 2001, p.117). It 
is argued that these vulnerabilities in the constructivist program can be addressed 
through greater investment in a partnership with feminism and the establishment of a 
greater dialogue between these two theories.  
  
Constructivists focus on ideational rather than material structures in the 
creation of ideas, norms, knowledge, culture, and identity that form the basis of 
collectively held “intersubjective” understandings of social and political interactions 
(Finnemore and Sikkink 2001; Thomas 2001; and Adler 1997). As Locher and Prugl 
note, “[c]onstructivists describe the world not as one that is, but as one that is in the 
process of becoming; they replace a ‘positional’ with a ‘transformational’ ontology” 
(Locher & Prugl 2001, p.114). Constructivists assert that political processes are social 
processes – political processes are constructed when actors follow rules and norms 
that are constituted by institutions, symbols, and languages in everyday life. Indeed, in 
their interactions with these structures, political actors engage in reproducing the 
structures that give their actions meaning, as well as legitimise their identity within 
the system. Theirs is a school of inquiry that attempts to mediate agency and structure 
in a manner that is “co-dependent” and mutually constituted – actors are allowed 
greater agency under the constructivist program, albeit their agency is constrained by 
the practices, interests, and identities of existing actors prevailing in the system in 
particular historical periods (Hopf 1998, p.177). Due to constructivism’s core 
assumptions, constructivists are chiefly concerned with framing and understanding the 
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answers to process questions – “how” norms and identities that shape social behaviour 
are formed - rather than understanding the nature of causality in political change when 
these structures are transformed. Thus, constructivism is criticised for a lack of a 
research agenda - there is little need to invest in a “constructivist methodology” for 
empirical analysis if the questions framed begets abstract theoretical answers, not hard 
and fast empirical proof. Meta-theory is not the goal, nor is it plausible, for 
constructivists as events and phenomena are contextually unique.  
 
 Like constructivism, feminism shares in the belief that the core concept of 
gender in feminist analysis is socially constructed.  However, it must be 
acknowledged that this shared belief is also a point of departure for feminists. As 
Zalweski notes, feminism is best framed as being “numerous sets of practices, 
theories, philosophies and perspectives which take gender as an important and often 
central category of analysis” (Zalweski 1995, p.341). Feminist theory is not a 
homogenous collective but has different variants with varying key assumptions – 
ranging from radical, liberal, critical realist and interpretive feminism – which leads to 
divergent theoretical frameworks and research agendas (Sylvester 1996, p.254; see 
also Randall 2002). Sylvester argues that there are two broad forms of feminist 
conceptualisation that most feminist theory can be categorically placed. Feminist 
theory is either positivist and “assimilationist” in seeking to uncover the gender biases 
in political theorising that have largely been unable to account for a “woman’s 
experience” in political phenomena in order to better include women in political 
processes. Alternatively, feminist theory can result from a “sceptical inclining” 
standpoint that highlights the reflexive, interpretive and fluid manner in which gender 
is socially constructed so that it is not discernable to conflate “women’s experiences” 
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in meta-theory (Sylvester 1996, p263). The latter “sceptical inclining” feminist 
positioning conceptualises “masculinities” and “femininities” so that assimilation of a 
feminist account is not critical for validating women’s experiences. A prescription of 
transformation not reconciliation of current methods of enquiry is recommended. 
Theorists such as Tickner argue for a reformulation of existing methods of theorising 
so that gendered narratives can be truly overcome (Tickner 1988). Due to the variant 
nature between feminist theories, there can be a difficulty in amalgamating feminist 
theories with other theories of political science (Locher & Prugl 2001, p.112). 
Therefore, I do not assume a convenient and happy marriage between feminism and 
constructivism without acknowledging and addressing profound differences.  
 
 In elucidating a marriage between constructivism and feminism, it must be 
noted that I allude mainly to the interpretive school of feminist theory. Interpretive 
approaches to feminism focus on the meanings that shape actions and institutions that 
constitute gendered identities in everyday life (Bevir & Rhodes 2002, p.131). Whilst 
interpretive feminism and constructivism are epistemologically compatible due to 
their fundamental belief in an ontology of becoming, it must be acknowledged where 
the two theories diverge. Namely, (1) constructivists are not chiefly concerned with 
power in the formation of social processes whereas feminists are deeply concerned 
with the nature of power to an understanding of social processes between and within 
genders; and (2) constructivists are more concerned with explaining political 
behaviour rather than changes in political behaviour, which feminists seek to 
understand for an analysis of power (Locher & Prugl 2001, p.111; Finnemore and 
Sikkink 1998, p.888). Nevertheless, through persistence in sociological methodology 
and explicit acknowledgement of ontological compatibility between variant strands of 
Lillian Mai 
Women and Work in Contemporary Japan: Deconstructing the “Crisis” of the Gender Order 
 
- 23 -  
feminism and constructivism, a middle ground between feminism and constructivism 
to reach a conceptualisation of “feminist constructivist” theory can be achieved. In 
doing so, I posit an empirical methodological partnership between interpretive 
feminism and constructivism using “gender norm” as the unit of analysis to discern 
key developments in Japanese gender relations since the 1990s. It is this gender norm 
theorisation that will now be discerned. 
 
 
Feminist Constructivism and the Gender Norm “Life Cycle” Model  
 
 In order to explain the origins of gender norms in Japan, their mechanism for 
gender identity influence, and the locus for change in the prevailing gender order, a 
blending of interpretive gender theorisation premised on hegemonic masculinity 
theory, as discussed in the preceding chapter, and constructivist conceptualisation by 
Finnemore and Sikkink as manifest in the norm “life cycle” model is advocated in 
order to arrive at an understanding of gender order equilibrium. From this Feminist 
Constructivist standpoint I will arrive at the gender norm “life cycle” model to 
investigate questions, including: i) what is a gender norm and how is it manifest in a 
society? ii) how are gender norms constructed or deconstructed? iii) how do gender 
norms impact on gender politics? and; iv) how are gender norms involved in the 
equilibrium and disequilibrium of the gender order. I will arrive at this juncture using 
research drawn from the following areas: empirical analysis of the trend in 
“feminisation” of non-regular employment in Japan and examination of developments 
in legislation and state policy including the “Vision of Gender Equality” policy, the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Law, the Child Care and Family Care Leave Law, 
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and the Part-time Work Law. It is hoped that through discussion of such case studies a 
greater dissection of the profound impact of gender norms on men and women, 
masculinities and femininities, and gender politics in Japan will be discerned. 
 
 
Definitions 
 Norms are generally defined as being a set of collectively held standards of 
“appropriate” and “inappropriate” behaviours for actors with given identities 
(Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, p.891).  Norms can either be categorically regulative, 
in that they constrain behaviour through moral assessment of the degree of 
“oughtness” for particular actions, or constitutive which allow behaviours A, B or C 
to be acceptable under certain conditions X, Y or Z (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 
p.891). Norms are important in explaining and understanding political behaviour 
because they regulate the available set of actions participants can choose from in 
certain historical, cultural and political contexts. Actors are bound to these normative 
posts by virtue of their identity of engagement within the prevailing structure. 
Participants recognize that deviant behaviour generates disapproval and stigma from 
co-identities whereas conforming behaviour invites praise and legitimacy for 
continued participation in the group structure. Moreover, Finnemore and Sikkink note 
that a norm is said to “exist” when its acceptance reaches beyond a “critical mass” of 
actors whereby the reflexivity or “doing” of the norm in everyday interactions has 
become internalised by a reasonable segment of the population so as not to raise any 
alarms of social discord (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, p.892). 
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 Within the context of feminist theory and gender politics discourse, gender 
norms refer to the standards of behaviour that socially constitutes appropriate conduct 
between and within masculine and feminine identities (Martin 2003, Donaldson 1993, 
Connell 1990, and West and Zimmerman 1987). Hopf argues that, “identities perform 
three necessary functions in a society: they tell you and others who you are and they 
tell you who others are” (Hopf 1998, p.175). In gender relations, those identities are 
constructed in opposition and complement the otherness between men and women, 
masculinity and femininity. In Japan, the daikokubashira ‘salaryman’ masculine ideal 
and complementary ryosai kenbo ‘good wife, wise mother’ feminine archetype are the 
two compounding normative gender identities that ensure the legitimisation and 
reproduction of the gender order status quo. By engaging with the “appropriate” 
behaviour of the male corporate warrior image, Japanese salarymen confirm their own 
identities as ‘men’, as well as perpetuate the hegemonic gender order that gives 
meaning and legitimacy to their ‘masculine’ identities vis a vis the corporation. 
Moreover, in acting in the ‘good wife, wise mother’ mould, Japanese women 
reinforce their feminine identity vis a vis their supplementary identity to that of the 
salaryman ideal, and hence validate the harmony and continual standard of the 
prevailing gender structure. That is, gender relations in Japan constitute a “mix” of 
gender norms premised on heterosexual gender relations – an intermarriage between 
hegemonic daikokubashira masculinity and emphasized ryosai kenbo femininity. To 
understand the historical trajectory and present intersubjective conditions of gender 
relations in Japan, I refer to the gender norm “life cycle model” discussed below, as 
adapted from the norm “life cycle” model of Finnemore and Sikkink. 
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The Norm “Life Cycle” Model 
 According to Finnemore and Sikkink, norm emergence, influence and change 
dynamics can be understood in three stages. 
 
 
 
 
 
Stage 1 Tipping 
Point 
Norm 
Emergence 
Norm 
Cascade 
Norm 
Internalisation 
Stage 2 Stage 3 
Figure 1: “Norm Life Cycle” model taken from Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, p.896) 
 
Figure 1 illustrates that the first stage in Finnemore and Sikkink’s norm “life cycle” 
model is norm emergence; subsequently there is a period of norm cascade; and finally 
norm internalisation. With respect to gender, the same “labels” of gender norm 
development at each respective stage still applies to distinguish motives and 
mechanisms for gender norm influence and adherence throughout the various degrees 
of gender norm crystalisation. 
 
STAGE 1: NORM EMERGENCE. This is the period of norm building. Norm 
entrepreneurs who have a vested interest in challenging the status quo, for both 
belligerent and altruistic motivations, “frame” issues by way of broadening existing 
definitions of proper behaviour for co-identities in the community. It must be noted, 
“new norms never enter a normative vacuum but instead emerge in a highly contested 
normative space where they must compete with other norms and perceptions of 
interest” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, p.897; also see Thomas 2001, p.33). 
Therefore, it is the role of norm entrepreneurs to sometimes initially engage in deviant 
behaviours from the accepted standard in order to persuade decision makers and elites 
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that the new benchmark is more congruent with prevailing historical, cultural and 
social forces (Hopf 1998, p.177). Thus, once norm entrepreneurs have persuaded a 
critical mass of actors to accept their position as norm leaders in the newly constituted 
order, the norm reaches a threshold whereby the norm has been institutionalised and 
codified within at least an organisational context so as to allow for the continual 
process of socialisation in the second phase of norm cascade (Finnemore and Sikkink 
1998, p.900). Within the organisational context of the workplace, gender identities are 
codified within the everyday institutional practicing of gender. Women perform the 
menial administrative tasks whilst men engage in higher decision making roles. This 
“practicing” of gender over time and organisational space leads to the broader 
socialisation of gender identities compatible with such a gender division of labour in 
the public, and also private, spheres. 
 
STAGE 2: NORM CASCADE. Norm entrepreneurs and norm leaders enhance 
widespread norm conformity through reformulating the matrix for norm compliance 
to promote the new standard of behaviour. Finnemore and Sikkink posit that norm 
entrepreneurs and leaders limit public opposition through the creation of a new 
community to which members must transfer their allegiance to in order to maintain 
the legitimacy of their identities. Those who comply with the socialisation process are 
exalted to the status of heroes for others to emulate, greater conformity to the new 
standard is received with praise and deviation is ridiculed by co-identities (Finnemore 
and Sikkink 1998, p.902). Therefore, for successful norm cascade to reach the final 
stage of norm acceptance, norm leaders must reverse the cognitive calculations of 
members so that conformity to the challenged norm becomes increasingly irrational 
within the context of identity homogeneity in group dynamics. For example, women 
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who assume managerial positions or other powerful positions are labelled as “pseudo-
men”, and thus gender norm defection of this nature is discouraged through ridicule of 
being “un-feminine”. 
 
STAGE 3: NORM INTERNALISATION. Norms are accepted when they acquire a 
“taken-for-granted” quality and cease to be an issue on the agenda for collective 
debate (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, p.895). The criteria being that the “doing” or 
practicing of standards of behaviour becomes non-reflexive so that the challenged 
norm to which the new norm supplanted becomes “sub-rationally unthinkable” 
(Martin 2003, p.352). More importantly is that whilst there may be a period in which 
“old” and “new” norms coincide, but once one norm becomes increasingly 
internalised we will usually witness the corresponding decline in the competing norm.  
 
 
Summary  
 
The nuanced conceptualisation of gender relations using constructivist 
feminist lenses with an appropriation of the “norm life cycle” model examined to 
gender analysis in contemporary Japan will now be the focus of the following 
chapters. Prior to investigating the nature of challenges to the gender order from 
within and mechanisms adopted for managing gender order instability, I will firstly 
consider the historical development of the prevailing hegemonic gender arrangement 
in Japan in order arrive at an understanding of the changes in gender norm dynamics 
to the present period. From this theoretical foundation I will discuss and explain 
recent developments in the labour market for women, with particular reference to the 
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rising discourse on the feminisation of part-time work in Japan, and relate these 
changes to the underlying hegemonic gender structure. Subsequently, I will analyse 
the extent to which stakeholders have been able to codify progressive gender neutral 
norms in the legislature in order to examine the degree of norm acceptance and 
protection. It is hoped that through this historically constituted methodological 
program, a comparative understanding of what gender relations in Japan was and is 
can be offered. 
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Chapter 3 
Sarariimen: Hegemonic Masculinity and the Dynamics of 
Gender Norm Compliance 
 
 The ideologies of “Sarariiman” (salaryman) and “Daikokubashira” (male 
“breadwinner” salaryman supporting the household) are the hegemonic masculine 
ideals in Japan to which resulting masculinities and femininities are defined. In order 
to understand challenges to this masculine reference point and indeed any 
transformation in the gender structure, it must first be explained the rise and nature of 
this hegemonic masculine ideal. The crystalisation of the sarariiman normative ideal 
in Japan will be discussed in three stages as espoused by the three stage norm “life 
cycle” model of Finnemore and Sikkink. The current and continual relevance of this 
hegemonic masculine norm is reinforced by norm entrepreneurs (corporations) in 
spite of exogenous economic challenges manifest in the economic downturn of the 
1990s. Historically and presently, the gender regime in Japan is defined by 
compliance to the sarariiman/daikokubashira masculine ideal for men and supporting 
ryosai kenbo ideal of femininity for women.  
 
 
The Daikokubashira: Masculinity Defined Through the Corporation 
 
Orii Hyuga, a personnel manager at Nippon Kokan steel mill (Japan’s second  
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largest steel mill with over 24,000 employees at two major sites) of 25 years, stated in 
his memoir that: 
 
 One day [in 1953], an accident occurred at the Kawasaki mill [of 
Nippon Kokan (NKK)]. Upon investigating, Vice-Superintendent 
Komaki discovered that the accident resulted from the employee’s 
exhaustion from staying up all night to care for his daughter, who 
was in the NKK hospital with a serious illness. Komaki was shocked 
at this fact, and he resolved that…the company’s welfare policy 
would have to be turned around 180 degrees to focus not only on the 
employee and the workplace, but to involve housewives and 
families, to increase the housewives’ cultivation, to systematize 
daily life, and to serve as an advisor or counsellor to realize the 
fruits of family health (Orii 1973 as quoted in Gordon 1997, p.246). 
 
The resulting action from this observation was the enactment of an in-company 
welfare system that encouraged workers and their families to adopt the “traditional 
family” model, referred to as the “New Life Movement” (Gordon 1997).  The 
movement was enacted in NKK in 1953 and by 1955 had become codified in all 
branches of the company. The central tenets of the movement were to harmonize 
“family life” with “corporate life” so that the two spheres were seen to be mutually 
congruent. Programs were designed to heighten morality through family planning 
measures and redesign social life so that Japan would evolve into a Kigyo Shakai 
(company-centred society) (Kimoto 1997; and Gordon 1997). In order to do so, 
movement programs were focused on the deliberate socialisation of the 
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daikokubashira and ryosai kenbo gender ideals for the betterment of the company (for 
further discussion of the programs instilled by NKK, please see Gordon 1997). As 
Orii further qualifies in his memoir: 
 
[I]n any human being’s life, workplace and home are intimately and 
inseparably related. Life in the home is the barometer for the next 
day’s life [at work]. In principle the housewife is in charge of home 
life, and we can say that the husband both takes his rest and builds 
his energy under her initiative. Thus, we wished to elevate the 
housewives who played this role and thereby establish the 
foundation for a bright, cheerful home, a bright society, and beyond 
that, a bright, cheerful workplace (Orii 1973 as quoted in Gordon 
1997, p.247). 
 
The in-house initiative of NKK illustrates the widely held view of Japan’s 
corporate elites that the family unit can legitimately be used as a means to achieve 
cohesion and efficiency in the workplace (Crawcour, 1978; and Bhappu 2000). That 
is, in order for efficient use of labour in the workplace, a specific gender division of 
labour and particular gender role ideals premised upon the daikokubashira and ryosai 
kenbo norms within the private sphere are tantamount (Gordon 1997, p.246). Of 
significance in the NKK case is the ordering of importance placed upon the corporate 
masculine identity above that of supporting feminine identities. Orii’s account 
highlights the centrality of the daikokubashira norm in acting as a reference point to 
which all other masculinities and feminities must coordinate. If not for the Vice-
Superintendent’s concern over the performance of his male employee and all those 
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others in the firm, then NKK executives would not have embarked upon a national 
corporate initiative to streamline the activities and behaviours of corporate spouses. In 
the case of NKK, Japanese familism had been incorporated under the banner of a 
corporate familism so the behaviour of co-genders in the Japanese family acted in 
accordance with a desire to ensure efficiency and harmony at the family unit level in 
order to fit in with the corporate family. The corporate family by extension of the 
traditional Japanese family unit became the central community for coordinating social 
life and gender relations between the sexes. In other words, the norm emergence of 
the hegemonic masculine ideal of the daikokubashira, was constructed vis-à-vis the 
Japanese firm, and is the principle in which the prevailing Japanese gender order is 
organised 
 
In order for the Japanese firm to bolster the daikokubashira hegemonic ideal, 
the ‘sarariiman’ identity with the promise of a “family wage” to support his 
household as exemplified through the practice of lifetime employment and seniority 
wages was instilled. Scholars have noted the centrality of the lifetime employment 
system as a symbol of Japan’s unique industrial relations system that has lead to the 
ascendency of the sarariiman (Kasuya 2005; Bhappu 2000; Clark 1988; Rohlen 1988; 
Cole 1979; Dore 1973; and Abegglen 1958). The permanent lifetime employment 
system refers to the practice whereby an employee enters a company after school 
graduation (including from Junior High School to University level), receives in-
company training, is payed according to length of service (or seniority), and remains 
an employee of that company until retirement (Ahmadjian and Robinson 2001, 
pp.623-624).  Hence the economic stability offered through the practices of lifetime 
employment and seniority wages legitimises the continual reverence for and 
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reproduction of the daikokubashira hegemonic ideal in Japan. The institutionalised 
dynamics of the lifetime employment system also ensures the socialisation of 
hegemonic masculine gender norms and compliance to such ideals is enforced 
through the carrot of economic stability and communal membership offered through 
the company. 
 
 Whilst the sarariiman identity is the hegemonic masculine ideal in Japan, it is 
pertinent to note that the system upon which the norm is premised is limited to a small 
prestigious group of highly educated male employees who are framed as “heroes” for 
all other would-be sarariimen to emulate. Scholars note that only approximately 20 
per cent of the workforce in Japan is covered under the lifetime employment system 
(Cole 1979, p.61). Therefore, as Dasgupta notes of this cleavage between the 
ideational prescription and empirical reality: 
 
[T]here is no denying that this ‘ideal’ of hegemonic masculinity 
does exert a powerful influence on men’s lives (and the lives of 
women as well) through the instruments of state and society, most 
men do not or cannot measure up to it. Thus, underlying the 
seemingly powerful dominant discourse are a host of individual 
ontologies of masculinity that engage with the dominant in varying 
ways. This engagement takes place both at a wider societal level and 
on the level of the individual (Dasgupta 2000, p.191).  
 
Nevertheless, although permanent employment has been more culturally associated 
with the managerial class than with the majority of the workforce, it is due to the 
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efficacy of this norm to shape and constrain masculine behaviour and gender identities 
of all non-privileged male members of Japanese society that is key for ensuring norm 
compliance within masculine identities (Dasgupta 2005, p.168).  
 
I will now investigate the historical development of the sarariiman norm in 
accordance with the “Norm Life Cycle” model espoused by Finnemore and Sikkink 
discussed in the previous chapter. In doing so I will discern the mechanisms through 
which the sarariiman hegemonic masculine principle influences subordinate 
masculinities and corresponding feminities. Of particular interest is to gain insight 
into which historical stage the prevailing gender order with the daikokubashira as 
central emerged, understanding how the hegemonic masculinity norm is manifest in 
Japanese society, what actors were involved in the construction of the norm in 
question, and the current outlook for the sarariiman and daikokubashira norms.  
Moreover, I wish to ask how the sarariiman and daikokubashira identities remain 
prominent in the gender discourse despite recent economic pressures that have called 
into question its continual legitimacy. 
 
 
Norm Emergence: Constructing the Sarariiman 
 
 The discourse on the emergence of the principles underpinning the sarariiman 
norm is marred by the question of to what extent there is a direct institutional 
continuity in employment institutions from the pre-modern period to the present day. 
In other words, is the practice of permanent employment a case of “conscious 
invention” by norm entrepreneurs or of “conscious borrowing” from the past? (Dore 
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1973, p.376). It is arguable that permanent employment and the foundations of the 
sarariiman identity is both a modern innovation and pre-modern tradition (Kasuya 
2005; and Dore 1973). Business elites in the large merchant houses including 
Kikkoman, Mitsui, Sumitomo and Mitsubishi deliberately framed corporate programs 
with the rhetoric of “family-as-firm,” by way of reaching back into pre-modern 
familial traditions in order to overcome the economic pressures of skilled labour 
shortages and high labour mobility during the early twentieth century (Crawcour 
1978, p.229). Therefore, whilst market forces precipitated labour management 
policies in Japan, it was the doctrine of traditional vertical familial ties instilled by 
business decision makers that provided the structural model of the modern firm. It is a 
relationship of childlike filial obligation from employee to employer and lifelong 
paternalistic responsibility from employer to employee that regulates the Japanese 
system of corporate loyalty and obligation. The framing of such norms premised on 
traditions of the past increased the acceptability of the emerging norm as it was seen 
to be congruent with the cultural piety of co-identities. 
 
 In his study of the historical development of industrial relations policies of the 
House of Mitsui from the Edo period (1603 to 1868) to the present, Kasuya 
demonstrates that the management policies of one of Japan’s oldest keiretsu’s is both 
an invention and an innovation (Kasuya 2005). Kasuya notes that the employment 
practices used by the House of Mitsui was representative of other merchant houses in 
Japan during the Edo period (Kasuya 2005, p.227). In principle, only young boys 
from the proprietors’ hometown were recruited into the family-owned and run 
business, and lived with the manager not unlike household servants. Employers were 
gradually promoted to higher ranks in regular intervals, with their wages rising 
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accordingly to reflect their seniority in the business. As a reward for their lifelong 
honesty, hard work, obedience, and loyalty, employees would progress to become 
managers, general managers and even have the opportunity to establish a business of 
their own as an extended branch of the merchant house (the branch-house system) 
using their retirement allowances (Kasuya 2005, p.227; see also Crawcour 1978, 
p.228). In the modern era, large Japanese corporations no longer recruit local village 
boys but Japanese college graduates of universities to which the corporation has a 
close tie, thereby replacing the village connections with a tertiary network (Beck and 
Beck 1994, p.36). Once hired, employees engage in in-house training to be promoted 
regularly according to tenure, with pay rises accordingly, to either become an 
executive or retire at the age of fifty-five. Thus, there have been subtle changes 
precipitated by the changed social, cultural and economic circumstances, however the 
ethos of the Japanese management system prevails. 
 
In re-inventing the corporate structure, Japanese business elites invoked 
cultural traditions premised upon pre-modern familial principles that were prevalent 
in village life. That is, business norm entrepreneurs framed management practices in 
response to economic pressures presented at the turn of the century that placed the 
social group above the individual. In doing so, compliance with group dynamics, 
including acting as the corporate warrior for Japanese men and as the corporate 
housewife for Japanese women in a heterosexual relationship for the benefit of the 
firm, was more achievable and manageable: 
 
The Japanese traditionally live in villages, where residents knew each 
other for whole lifetimes. Only that social group – the village and the 
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family in the context of the village – defined the individual. To be cut 
off from the village or the family, therefore, was to be cut off from 
one’s personal identity and connectedness (Beck and Beck 1994, 
p.63). 
 
Business decision makers reformulated the matrix for norm compliance by tightening 
the social fabric so that the threat of deviant behaviour or identities is deterred by the 
highest social punishment imaginable, mura hachiba (social exile) from the 
community in which one belongs to become a ronin (social pariah). Punishment for 
gender norm defection through the threat of social marginalisation acted as the stick to 
which norm compliance was ensured.  
 
 
Norm Cascade: Entrenching the Sarariiman 
 
 In institutionalising the sarariiman norm, business elites embarked upon 
entrenching the permanent employment system for all companies to emulate, with the 
goal to make lifetime employment the standard national industrial relations practice. 
Although the period of a worker’s employment tenure began to lengthen to greater 
approximate that of a ‘lifetime’ commitment in the 1920s, it is generally agreed that 
the lifetime employment system did not become established in the majority of large 
firms for both skilled white collar labour and semi-skilled blue collar labour until after 
World War II (Kasuya 2005; Fruin 1983; Cole 1979; and Dore 1973).  The majority 
of Japanese youths experience similar employment experiences that cover their life 
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cycles from recruitment and induction into a firm through to retirement. The phases of 
employment are elaborated as follows: 
 
1. THE RECRUITMENT PROCEDURE. Japanese firms follow a four step 
recruitment process for new college graduates: 1) universities appointment bureau are 
contacted to refer a quota of suitable students to sit the company entrance exam; 2) 
entrance exams; 3) interview screening; 4) personal background checks (Dore 1973, 
p.49). The purpose of the cumbersome process is to ensure thoroughness in choosing 
the right candidate to which the firm will get maximum returns for their lifelong 
commitment as beneficiary. And conversely, that the candidate will honour their filial 
obligations to the company throughout their tenure.  
 
2. SOCIALISATION INTO THE COMPANY. In inducting the employee into the 
firm as one of the company’s cohort of sarariimen, the employee is afforded several 
non-monetary benefits, which further instils loyalty, diligence and obedience. These 
benefits include short term company housing for bachelors or honeymooning couples, 
company sponsored low-interest rate home loans, educational loans for dependents, 
sports club memberships, use of company resorts and inclusion into company expense 
accounts for entertaining purposes (Beck and Beck 1994, p.77). These benefits 
encourage the development of interpersonal linkages between the new employee and 
the company, as well as with other company personnel to further tighten the company 
social fabric. It is intended that once the new recruits become accustomed to such 
standards, that they will limit defective behaviour and actions to maintain such 
privileges and ensure their continual membership into the company community.  
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3. SALARY. As mentioned, Japanese worker’s salaries have become quite predictable 
under the vestiges of the lifetime employment and seniority wages. Even during the 
Edo period in the House of Mitsui, there was a visible relationship between tenure, 
title and salaries, which remains in the present period (Kasuya 2005, p.229). It has 
been noted that it is not the modest wages that encourages employee productivity but 
the promise of security and prestige with working for a prominent Japanese firm 
(Beck and Beck 1994, p.79). Moreover, considering the rigidity and predictability of 
the Japanese management system with respect to salary and promotion practices, 
labour mobility is discouraged as employees who defect from their social contract 
with the company in lieu of an opportunity with another company will have to re-start 
their careers at the bottom of the hierarchy at the new firm. 
 
4. PROMOTION. Although the promise of seniority wages with lifetime employment 
ensures an economic and social safety net for employees, the roles of bucho (general 
manager) and shacho (president) are limited and cannot be attained by everyone. 
Moreover, promotions are not awarded on merit or tenure alone, but great emphasis is 
placed upon personality and ability to best conform to the company’s interpretation of 
sarariiman (Beck and Beck 1994, pp.79-83). That is, the nature of Japanese 
companies’ promotional system is another carrot to which employees can be 
motivated to conform to company norms and expectations.  
 
5. RETIREMENT. Employees are generally faced with an early retirement compared 
to their Western counterparts between the ages of fifty-five to sixty, unless they have 
been lucky enough to secure a position of yakuin (president or director) (Beck and 
Beck 1994, pp.83-84). Once retired, employees can expect a lump-sum retirement 
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benefit to supplement their savings (Beck and Beck 1994, p.83). Again, the 
company’s’ standard retirement policy provides a measure of predictability and 
stability for employees in their old age, to which non-sarariimen are not afforded. 
 
Therefore, during the post-World War II era, Japanese business decision 
makers harmonised their labour management policies so that lifetime employment and 
seniority wages was the standard industrial relations program in the majority of large 
Japanese firms. In order to gain access into this social community, Japanese men had 
to aspire to the sarariiman identity. The pervasiveness of the Japanese employment 
system ensured familial-like allegiance to the firm in return for continual legitimacy 
and access in the cohesive Japanese fabric. Successful corporate elites fortunate 
enough to secure yakuin positions serve as exemplars for other would-be sarariimen, 
whilst non-compliant sarariimen relegated to their low-level positions serve as the 
stick that warns against deviant behaviour and actions. That is:  
 
[T]he more an individual internalizes the classic Japanese system of 
the primacy of the group, follows the norms, and tries to encourage 
others to follow the norms, the more loyalty that individual is likely to 
show to the group. As each act of social control invoked by a specific 
social control forms an ever-tightening spiral. In the minds of many 
Japanese these concepts – standards, control and loyalty – have been 
wound together so tightly that the differences have become almost 
impossible to tease apart (Beck and Beck 1994, p. 66). 
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The result for the present period being that business decision makers as sarariimen 
norm entrepreneurs have become successful in their attempts to reverse the cognitive 
considerations of Japanese men so that non-conformity to the sarariiman and 
daikokubashira gender norms is a non-option in the context of identity cohesion in 
corporate community dynamics. 
 
It is notable that during this period of internalization of the sarariiman identity 
in the corporate context, there is a corresponding institutionalisation of the 
daikokubashira ideal and ryosai kenbo archetype in the localised family unit level. In 
order for men to become effective sarariimen, Japanese women had to be satisfied in 
being managers of the household. The lifelong commitment structure of the 
permanent employment system is not conducive to the reproductive roles of women 
as wives and mothers. Hence, Japanese women were discriminated against in labour 
management policies for the economic effectiveness of the nation. In other words, it is 
in the post World War II period, that the prevailing gender order of daikokubashira 
central gender figure, with supporting ryosai kenbo counterpart emerged (this is to be 
the focus of the next chapter).  
 
 
Norm Acceptance: ‘Doing’ the Sarariiman 
 
 By the 1990s, the prevailing gender order of daikokubashira/ryosai kenbo and 
corporate warrior norm had become firmly established. In a comparative ethnographic 
study of fifty-two Japanese and fifty-two American adults on social and cultural 
psychology, Mathews’ study confirmed the degree of internalisation in which 
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Japanese co-identities conformed to the espoused gender norms (Mathews 1996). 
Mathews’ survey indicated that the ikigai (that which most motivates one to live) for 
was family and children for Japanese women, and work and company, followed by 
family, for Japanese men. Moreover, Japanese respondents placed a higher degree of 
importance on social affinity, in comparison to American respondents, which is 
congruent to the group over individual mentality upheld by the firm-as-family 
doctrine. 
 
 Moreover, qualitative fieldwork conducted in the 1990’s of white collar 
employees of two Japanese private sector organisations in a prefecture of northern 
Japan conducted Dasgupta, confirms the degree of internalisation of the sarariiman 
norm to social constructions of masculinity as perceived by Japanese men. 
Respondents offered the following views on the centrality of work to their perceptions 
of masculine identity: 
 
[I]n this day and age, I think “work” still…occupies a big part in a 
man. There’s the consideration of how this will change in the 
future. But for now…I think work is probably by and large the 
main thing…I think work occupies a big part of myself (quoted in 
Dasgupta 2005, p.170) 
 
At the point I joined this organization…I expected to continue in 
this job for life; and thought I’d get married, and after a child was 
born, on the salary I receive, would support a family; that was my 
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thinking. And, since now that I’m married and have a family, I still 
think that (quoted in Dasgupta 2005, p.170) 
 
[If] I didn’t have a job, just thinking about a situation when I may 
not have a job is scary…It’s frightening…It’s like you become an 
animal which can’t hunt/find its food. Because an animal which 
can’t get its own food, at that point, within the animal kingdom 
that signifies death (quoted in Dasgupta 2005, p.171) 
 
The result being, the ideology which defines and determines hegemonic masculinity 
primarily through work has become thoroughly entrenched in Japanese masculine 
psyche so that the “reflexivity” or “performativity” (the process whereby gender 
identity is constructed through repetitive enactments or “performances”, to borrow the 
term of Judith Butler) (Butler 1990) of the hegemonic masculine gender norm has 
sub-rationally become the accepted standard for masculine conduct. In other words, it 
can be stated that the sarariiman and daikokubashira norms have become the 
accepted hegemonic masculine identity in Japan. 
 
 
The 1990s Forward: The Decline of the Sarariiman? 
 
 It has been eluded that we are seemingly witnessing a decline, indeed a crisis, 
of the permanent employment system and sarariiman gender norm. The bursting of 
the economic bubble in the early 1990’s has seen an increase in the unemployment 
rate to over 5 percent, as well as a tightening of the lifetime employment system as 
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firms have downsized and reformed their labour management practices to remain 
economically viable in the period of internationalisation and deregulation of Japanese 
industries. Ahmadjian and Robinson argue that the trend in downsizing amongst 
Japanese firms in the 1990s has delegitimised and deinstitutionalised the practice of 
permanent employment as the social networks underpinning the lifetime employment 
system have been undermined by the disruptions to labour management policy 
(Ahmadjian and Robinson 2001). Announcements of corporate downsizing was met 
with criticism by the media and the Japanese community as an “unfair” breach of 
corporations’ paternal responsibility to their employees, which in turn undermine their 
reputation as preferred employer for future cohorts of company recruits, which will 
consequently have a negative generational impact for the survivability of the lifetime 
employment system (Ahmadjian and Robinson 2001, pp.624-626).  
 
 Further micro analysis of company responses to the recent economic pressures 
do not support the view that the age of permanent employment and the sarariiman is 
over. National surveys and interviews conducted by the Ministry of Labour between 
1993 and 1995 to comparatively discuss Japanese employment adjustments during 
economic downturns with respect to recessions in the 1990s, 1986, and 1974 reveal a 
coordinated effort by Japanese business to lessen the severity of employment 
adjustments during periods of recession (Usui and Colignon 1996, pp.554-555). The 
results indicate that Japanese firms engage in a sequence of labour adjustment 
strategies that seek to encourage internal labour flexibility with the least disruption to 
labour and avoid termination where possible. The sequence of labour adjustment 
strategies is as follows: 
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1. reduction of overtime work and bonus; 
2. reassignment and dispatching of workers; 
3. no mid-career hiring and no hiring of new graduates; 
4. dismissal of part-time and temporary workers; 
5. allocation of extended vacations; 
6. temporary factory closing; and 
7. voluntary retirement and dismissal of workers 
(Usui and Colignon 1996, p.555) 
 
What does this evidence present for the current outlook of the lifetime employment 
system? The suggestion is that whilst the lifetime employment practice has been 
declining for the new generation of cohorts and for those entering retirement (on the 
principle of last hired, first fired and that older employees are more expensive to 
retain under the seniority wage system), the “core” workforce of those in between 
recruitment and retirement ages remain protected (Ono 2007, p.35). Moreover, the 
Japanese government had revised legislation in response to the 1974 oil shock 
recession under the Employment Insurance Law with the enactment of the 
Employment Stabilisation Services programs, which economically compensates 
employers to avoid the termination of staff in recessions. Further, in 1994 the Ministry 
of Labour strengthened the government’s commitment to this program by relaxing the 
eligibility requirements for companies receiving subsidies as well as extending the 
duration of subsidy receipt for up to three years under the Total Plan for Employment 
Adjustment. The legislation uses employee contributions equal to 1.25 percent of the 
employees salary to reward and relieve companies that restructure without terminating 
employees using strategies including temporary release from work or temporary 
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transfer of staff to other firm branches (Usui and Colignon 1994, pp.563-564). In 
supporting such legislation, the Japanese government is acknowledging the 
significance of the lifetime employment system and sarariiman lifestyle to the 
continual harmony of Japanese society and gender relations. Hence, the defining 
practice of lifetime employment and sarariiman lifestyle remains a continuing feature 
of Japans’ employment system despite recent economic pressures that have threatened 
to undermine its legitimacy and longevity. 
 
 
Summary 
  
 The pattern of gender relations in contemporary Japan is characterised by the 
efficacy of the sarariiman and daikokubashira male gender norms, which emerged 
from pre-industrial traditions of the Meiji era to be institutionalised in the post World 
War II period and firmly accepted in the present period. Throughout the various 
phases of norm crystalisation corporate institutions and corporate elites have been the 
main parties in encouraging the internalisation of this norm. Indeed, these male 
hegemonic gender norms have been constructed vis-à-vis the corporation. It has been 
argued that initial motivations of corporate norm entrepreneurs has been due to 
economic imperatives, but once these norms were established continual maintenance 
and reverence for these ideals have become internally driven. Whilst the emergence of 
these hegemonic masculine norms initially developed from material motivations,  
once entrenched and accepted the new practices, institutions and cognitive reasonings 
(mainly lifetime employment, seniority wages and the family-as-firm doctrine) which 
uphold and reproduce these norms have created an internal dynamic such that 
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exogenous material factors have become less consequential in their shaping and 
legitimacy (as illustrated via discussion of the economic challenges of the 1990s). 
Resultantly, the current outlook for the gender regime in Japan is such that the 
ideational structure frames and constrains motivations and developments in the 
material structure and not vice versa. This is further explained and supported with 
reference to a discussion of emerging trends in women’s employment practices, which 
will the focus of the following chapter. 
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Chapter 4 
Feminisation of Part-time Work and Continuity in Gender 
Norm Dynamics 
 
 Japanese women’s representation in paid work is perceived as being 
symptomatic of women’s denouncement of traditional ryosai kenbo duties in line with 
aforementioned trends in expanding tertiary qualifications and postponement of 
marriage and childrearing. However, closer examination of the “feminisation” of part-
time employment, which refers to the growing trend of Japanese women in non-
regular employment, reveals that engagement in part-time work does not present an 
avenue through which women are able to challenge the prevailing sarariiman male 
gender norm and daikokubashira centred gender order. Indeed, the growing practice 
of the feminisation of part-time employment is a measure to which women’s dissent is 
co-opted into the prevailing gender arrangement as intended by corporate norm 
entrepreneurs with the support of the state apparatus.  
 
 
Women in the Japanese Labour Market: A Current Overview 
 
 Prior to conceptualising the gendered nature of work in Japan, an overview of 
women’s employment must first be provided.  There has been a steady increase in 
women’s labour force participation since the immediate post-war period. Official 
statistics reveal that in 1950, the number of female workers engaged in the wage 
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labour market totalled 3.6 million, which increased to 10 million by 1967, and as at 
1998 figured as 21.3 million (Japan Institute of Women’s Evolution [hereafter JIWE] 
2007). Moreover, women’s employment has increased by 80.8 percent over the period 
from 1974 to 1999 to now comprise 40 per cent of the total workforce, as indicated in 
table 1. 
 
Table 1. Employees in the Japanese labour market by gender, 1974-1999 
Year Total Employment Male Employment Female Employment 
  Millions Percentage Millions 
As a percentage 
of total 
employment Millions 
As a percentage 
of total 
employment 
1974 35.12 100.0 23.69 68.1 11.43 31.9 
1984 41.80 100.0 26.96 64.5 14.84 35.5 
1994 51.44 100.0 31.53 61.3 19.91 38.7 
1999 52.20 100.0 31.53 60.4 20.67 39.6 
 
Source: Adapted from Kezuka 2000 quoted in Kumamoto-Healey 2005, p.458, table. 4 
 
Further, that the growth in female composition of the labour force in the post-
war period has also seen significant changes in the composition of the female 
workforce between regular full-time employment and irregular part-time forms of 
employment, as well as by industry. Table 2 illustrates that there has been 
considerable growth in the incident of part-time employment in the Japanese labour 
market, and that female employees overwhelmingly represent this. Indeed, as 
Broadbent notes, “[w]omen have always been a presence in Japan’s paid workforce; 
what has changed is that more women are employed in part-time work” (Broadbent 
2003, p.4). It is pertinent to note that non-regular employment in Japan includes 
casuals, temporaries, dispatch, piece, seasonal, sub-contract, day workers as well as 
part-time workers so as not to conflate the term. Nevertheless, of the number of 
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female non-standard workers in Japan, part-time work represents the growing form of 
employment for women. 
 
One-fifth of Japan’s non-agricultural workforce is employed part-time and 
women comprise 68 per cent of the part-time workforce (estimations as of 2003, 
reveal that this figure has now reached 72 per cent) (Broadbent 2003, p.1). In 1994 the 
increase in the number of part-time jobs was 9 per cent on the previous year, and in 
1995, the number increased again by 14 per cent from the 1994 figure (Broadbent 
2003, p.4). This is comparable with the labour adjustment strategies by business, 
mentioned in the previous chapter, for greater labour flexibility in order to offset the 
dampening effects from the economic recession of the 1990s, which peaked in 1994.  
 
Table 2. Female part-time employees in the non-agricultural sector, 1974-1999 
Year Total Employment Part-time employment Number of female part-time employees 
  Millions Percentage Millions 
As a 
percentage of 
total 
employment Millions 
As a 
percentage of 
total female 
employment 
As a 
percentage of 
total 
employment 
As a 
percentage of 
total part-
time 
employment
1974 35.12 100.0 3.02 8.6 1.84 16.1 5.2 60.9 
1984 41.80 100.0 4.46 11.1 3.28 22.1 7.8 70.7 
1994 51.44 100.0 9.67 18.8 6.47 32.5 12.6 66.9 
1999 52.20 100.0 11.38 21.8 7.73 37.4 14.8 67.9 
Source: Adapted from Kezuka 2000 quoted in Kumamoto-Healey 2005, p.458, table. 4,  
         
 
Notes: Kezuka defines part-time employees (including seasonal and irregularly employed persons) as those whose 
weekly working hours total less than 35 hours. This definition excludes temporary workers and the self employed 
 
Also of significance is that of the 72 per cent of female part-time workers, 57 per cent 
of women are working in tertiary and service sector industries including retail, 
wholesale, finance, health and restaurants (Broadbent 2003, p.3).  Broadbent notes 
that of these tertiary and service sector female part-time employees, 25.5 per cent are 
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employed in sales positions, 19 per cent are represented in production roles, 18 per 
cent in service and 13 per cent in clerical positions (Broadbent 2003, p.3). Table 3 
reveals that women’s status in low-level non-regular employment with relatively 
limited decision making responsibilities is manifest in the persistent wage differentials 
between men and women in Japan (see Nagase 1997). 
 
Table 3. Hourly pay for regular and part-time workers by sex, 1989-1998 
Year Women Men Female-to-male wage ratio 
  
Regular 
Workers 
(Yen) 
Part-time 
workers 
(Yen) 
Wage ratio 
(Regular 
worker=100) 
Regular 
Workers 
(Yen) 
Part-time 
workers 
(Yen) 
Wage ratio 
(Regular 
worker=100)
Regular 
workers (%) 
Part-time 
workers (%) 
1989 934 662 70.9 1542 855 55.4 60.6 77.4 
1994 1201 848 70.6 1915 1037 54.2 62.7 81.8 
1998 1295 886 68.4 2002 1040 51.9 64.7 85.2 
         
Average 
1989-98 1155.0 811.0 70.2 1846.0 1017.0 55.1 62.5 79.7 
         
 
Source: Adapted from Kezuka 2000, based on Ministry of Labours Basic surveys on wage structure quoted on 
Kumamoto- Healey 2005, p.460 
 
Another form of non-regular employment of which women predominate is in the 
temporary work sector. Weathers notes that of almost 90 per cent of the registered 
temporary workers in Japan, who comprise 1.1 per cent of the total workforce and 3.9 
per cent of all non-regular workers, are women (Weathers 2001, p.204). Whilst the 
total number of temporary workers is not significantly large, the concentration of 
women in this form of generally low-level and low-paying (also mostly clerical) work 
where they are afforded limited legislative protection relative to full-time employees 
similar to the case of part-time employees is of interest (for further discussion see 
Weathers 2001).  
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The overall trend for the feminisation of women’s labour in Japan in part-time, 
indeed non-regular, forms of employment is evident over the life cycle. Scholars have 
noted the “M” shape for women’s labour force participation (see Kumamoto-Healey 
2005, p.452; and Yu 2002). Japanese women have empirically remained in the 
workforce up until marriage and re-enter the workforce after childbirth or when their 
children are of school age, forming an “M” shape which peaks around the 20-24 and 
45-49 age brackets (refer to table 4).  
 
Table 4. Employment rates for women by age group, 1970-1998 
    
Female employment rate as percentage of total female 
workforce by age group 
Year 
Female 
employment 
of total 
workforce 
(%) 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-54 55-64 65+ 
1970 27.0 30.3 59.8 27.1 21.3 36.0 26.5 13.6 2.9 
1980 29.5 17.0 63.3 36.2 28.9 34.2 36.2 19.1 4.1 
1990 35.4 16.0 69.4 52.9 38.8 45.4 48.3 23.7 4.5 
1998 38.5 15.2 66.4 61.0 46.4 50.4 54.9 32.0 5.2 
 
Source: Adapted from Management and Coordination Agency, Labour Force Survey available from 
JIWE website http://www.jiwe.or.jp/english/situation/working.html (accessed 26/08/2007) 
 
Considering the structural rigidities of the Japanese labour market, marked by 
practices of lifetime employment and seniority wages, women’s non-market choices 
over their life cycle are not compatible with the system of continuous employment 
and therefore must ‘choose’ part-time employment to better balance their life/work 
responsibilities.  
 
To reiterate, the general statistics confirm that the current state for women and 
work in the Japanese labour market are as follows: Japanese women now comprise of 
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a significant segment in the paid labour force in Japan. Recent economic challenges, 
due to the economic recession of the 1990s, has seen increasing casualisation of the 
workforce to retain internal labour market flexibility, with minimum disruption to the 
work practices that affect the “core” standard labour force covered by permanent 
employment practices (ie. the sarariiman). Women of late marrying age or married 
women re-entering the labour force after childbirth and childrearing decisions have 
largely filled this trend towards greater employment of non-regular workers.  
 
The question I seek to address for the remainder of this chapter is “does the 
trend in the feminisation of part-time work in Japan represent a case for hegemonic 
gender norm compliance or departure?” and “what is the outcome of this for the 
prevailing gender order?” Of interest is the social and political logic, and 
ramifications underpinning women’s representation in part-time employment for 
gender relations between the sexes. That is, whether women’s involvement in non-
regular employment affords them greater ability and power to redress the gender 
balance as a result of their enhanced economic standing, or whether this 
‘enhancement’ in economic status by way of part-time employment is merely a 
chimera. I seek to understand the political and ideological motivations of the main 
actors involved (women and business) in participating in this social and economic 
phenomenon, as well as relate these changes to the normative gender structure vis-à-
vis an analysis of how they impact upon the prevailing daikokubashira/ryosai kenbo 
hegemonic gender order.   
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Conceptualising the Feminisation of Part-time Work in Japan 
 
Prior research has tended to adopt either supply or demand side explanations 
to explain women’s concentration in part-time and non-standard forms of 
employment. The family “life cycle” nature of women’s work centres on the 
incompatibility between continuous lifetime employment practices for women and 
their domestic responsibilities throughout their life course including marriage and 
post-natal responsibilities (Kumamoto-Healey 2005; Osawa 2004-2005; and 
Nakamatsu 1994). It is argued that part-time work is an attractive “choice” for 
married women with child rearing responsibilities that are time-poor and favour the 
flexible working hours that are not afforded to full-time status employees (Nakamatsu 
1994, p.88).  
 
Alternatively, Houseman and Abraham highlight labour demand conditions 
such as the need from Japanese firms to have an “auxiliary” pool of labour that can be 
easily and cheaply adjusted to relieve exogenous economic pressures (Houseman and 
Abraham 1993). The logic is that in high growth periods, part-time worker hours can 
be extended to meet increasing service or production demand, and can be relieved 
through attrition or hiring freezes during tough periods. Again, the assumption by 
employers is that the majority of part-time employees who are married, seek paid 
employment to supplement the daikokubashira household income – hence the 
prevalence of the “M” curve in female labour force participation rates over the female 
life course. Thus it is seen as inefficient to invest in the “managerial” career track of 
female workers who empirically leave the workforce after marriage and re-enter only 
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on part-time basis so as not to interfere with the competing demands of their non-
market duties (Brinton 1988, p.318). 
 
Prevalent amoung both supply side and demand side explanations is the 
construction of women’s work with reference to ryosai kenbo gender norm ideology. 
Women’s status in paid employment is auxiliary to their roles as mothers and wives in 
the private sphere. It assumes that there is a natural choice for women to engage in 
part-time employment whilst ignoring the structural barriers that limit the available 
range of options to women. For example, regular full-time working women who leave 
the workforce after marriage, cannot re-enter the labour market after child birth to 
reassume their regular worker status even if this was their primary choice. The 
existing labour relations system, premised upon continuous employment and tenure-
based wages, privileges and rewards male workers who can commit to the demanding 
organisational culture of long hours at work, after work socialisation with colleagues, 
and frequent inter-branch reassignments which women with familial responsibilities 
cannot compete with (Gottfreid and Hayashi-Kato 1998, p.30). Institutionalised 
labour market constraints can act as a barrier to free labour mobility between regular 
and non-regular employment for women, thereby restricting their available options for 
employment “choices” to that which does not detract from the security of permanent 
employment for the “core” workforce. The limitation of such analysis is that it cannot 
account for the power disadvantage of such kinds of gender bias in existing practices 
of work. Moreover, profound explanations for the persistence of gendered perceptions 
of women’s work cannot be discerned.  
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Building from the dichotomous conceptualisation of married women in part-
time employment presented by supply and demand side theorists, structural based 
explanations have been presented. Such explanations do not offer optimistic 
predictions for future developments in gender equality. Rather, they identify the 
recent changes in women’s employments as an empirical testament to the survival of 
the lifetime employment system and continual efficacy of the sarariiman hegemonic 
masculine gender norm. Gottfreid and Hayashi-Kato draw on qualitative and 
quantitative fieldwork evidence established during the early to mid 1990s to conclude 
that a gendered wage contract modelled on the daikokubashira and ryosai kenbo 
gender roles to approximate a male “breadwinner” gender contract, is upheld and 
reproduced by the prevailing Japanese employment system. This gender wage 
contract favours men as full-time wage earners and women as part-time auxiliary 
wage workers. Moreover, that structural legitimacy of the Japanese industrial relations 
system is supported by coordinated efforts by capital and the state to entrench this 
gender contract for greater economic efficiency (Gottfried and Hayashi-Kato 1998). 
Therefore, women’s engagement with part-time work does not represent greater 
economic choice or freedom for women to engage in public and private life (see 
Kamamoto-Healey 2005), rather it serves as a political strategy used by business and 
the state to neutralise calls for gender equality and legitimise continual reverence for 
the sarariiman hegemonic masculinity norm.  
 
Further, in light of the recent trend in the feminisation of part-time work, Kaye 
Braodbent’s field study of Daiichi (a pseudonym) supermarket chains in Japan from 
1992-1993 further develops on this discourse in arguing that the expansion of part-
time employment is a coordinated employer and government strategy to create a 
Lillian Mai 
Women and Work in Contemporary Japan: Deconstructing the “Crisis” of the Gender Order 
 
- 58 -  
segregated employment track for women that is able to co-exist with and support the 
maintenance of lifetime employment practices. Further, the labour cost savings from 
the feminisation of part-time employment directly ensures the viability of lifetime 
employment for the core (male) workforce, which is traditionally more labour-
expensive (and afforded greater employment rights). Broadbent maintains that part-
time work is a deliberate institutional strategy to further entrench the gendered 
division of labour and hence the prevailing gender order between the sexes 
(Broadbent 2003 and 2001). These explanations shift the focus from gendering 
women and work with recourse to the ryosai kenbo gender norm to that of the 
daikokubashira gender norm. Women’s contribution and status in paid employment is 
conceived as being complementary to and supportive of the prevailing gender order. 
Indeed, the state and businesses are integral in the construction and maintenance of 
such gender norm dynamics.  
 
Arguments such as those presented by Gottfried and Hayashi-Kato, and 
Broadbent are further strengthened when analysing current tax system incentives 
which seek to perpetuate the dependent familial role of married women in part-time 
employment and daikokubashira “breadwinner” role of Japanese men in full-time 
employment. The Japanese tax system stipulates that those earning less than one 
million yen annually are exempt from paying income tax. This incentive is targeted at 
part-time workers (ie. women) who work 22-30 hours of work per week, based on the 
average hourly pay for women as indicated by the Ministry of Labour in 1995 (Yu 
2002, p.502). Moreover, husbands with spouses earning less than the stipulated 
amount receive tax deductions on their annual salary in addition to health and pension 
insurance for their dependents from their employer if their spouse earns below the 
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threshold of 1,030,000 yen per year (Yu 2002, pp.502-503). This tax incentive is not 
an example of progressive state policy in acknowledging women’s dual role in the 
public and private sphere, but effectively encourages part-time wives to remain in 
part-time employment and thereby reinforce the gendered division of labour in society 
and the current gender order (see Nakamatsu 1994). It is evident that the feminisation 
of part-time work is a means through which continuity in the prevailing gender order 
with the woman as primary caregiver (ryosai kenbo) and male as breadwinner 
(daikokubashira) can be achieved. Through greater emphasis upon gender biases in 
the structural sphere, a more holistic understanding of the gendered nature of women 
and work that can be accounted for and persistencies in the system has been 
conceived. 
 
 
Summary 
 
Women’s representation in part-time employment is a gendered work strategy 
designed by corporate norm entrepreneurs and codified in tax legislature by the state, 
not a measure to which women are able to challenge the gender order from within. 
The feminisation of part-time work as a gendered employment strategy co-opts 
women’s aggravation with their ryosai kenbo normative gender identity under the 
pretext of greater “choice” and work/life balance and gives women the perception that 
they have a greater voice in the corporate sphere to which Japanese daily life is 
structured. The strength of the sarariiman and daikokubashira hegemonic masculine 
ideals continues in spite of women’s “protest” from within the material sphere. The 
framing of the material sphere by the ideational structure with recourse to gender 
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arrangements in Japan is also exemplified in employment legislature and state related 
policy. Indeed state actions and policies are framed with chief consideration to 
supporting corporate strategies in the management of gender relations and 
maintaining the gender order status quo.  
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Chapter 5 
Employment Legislation and State Protection of Gender 
Norm Dynamics 
 
 The 1990s presented two major concerns for the government at the end of the 
post World War II high growth era: a declining birth rate approaching below 
replacement level; and ascending unemployment. These issues directly challenged the 
legitimacy of the existing gender contract as the vestiges of the sarariiman system 
could no longer seemingly be guaranteed under flailing economic growth (Hitoshi, 
Ryuko and Osamu 1997). In order to ensure gender order stability and perpetuate 
gender norm dynamics underpinning that equilibrium, it will be maintained that the 
Japanese government has replicated business in its strategy to encourage women into 
irregular modes of employment for the betterment of the daikokubashira ideal vis-à-
vis promoting women as the primary care givers. This government strategy of catering 
to the needs of corporations for a flexible workforce under the strident pressures of 
economic recession, packaged in the rhetoric of greater work/life balance for women, 
illustrates business and state commitment to continue delivering on the promise of 
lifetime employment and seniority wages for the core male workforce. This alignment 
of state and corporate objective has been co-opted and institutionalised in legislation 
and policy as evident by: i) the Equal Employment Opportunity Law; ii) the Child 
Care and Family Care Leave Law; and iii) the Part Time Work Law. The focus of this 
chapter is to reveal how the aforementioned legislation and policies has resulted in the 
state’s continual reverence for the gender order status quo. 
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Government Response to the Economic Challenges of the 1990s  
  
 By the mid to late 1990s, the Japanese government had enacted reform that 
seemingly questions the future relevancy of existing hegemonic gender norms. Prime 
Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro cited socioeconomic developments evident in the 1990s 
– the ageing population, the declining fertility rate, the maturation and 
internationalisation of the Japanese economy – as reasoning for social reform and 
reconceptualisation of the existing gender contract with the goal of building a gender-
equal society (quoted in Osawa 2000, p.3). Hashimoto’s pledge for reform was 
premised on the recommendations presented in the report, “Vision of Gender 
Equality: Creating New Values for the 21st Century”  (hereafter the “Vision of 
Gender Equality”; available at http://www.gender.go.jp/english_contents/toshin-
e/index.html) submitted by the Council for Gender Equality (created by ordinance of 
the government) in 1996, which was refashioned under “The National Plan of Action 
for Promotion of a Gender-Equal Society by the Year 2000” (second revision 1996, 
hereafter the “Plan for Gender Equality 2000”; available at 
http://www.gender.go.jp/english_contents/koudou/index.html). In addition, the Vision 
of Gender Equality was ratified in legislature as, “The Basic Law for a Gender Equal 
Society” which was passed in 1999. The goal of such legislation is to create the 
following: 
 
[A] society in which both men and women shall be given equal 
opportunities to participate voluntarily in activities at all levels as 
equal partners and shall be able to enjoy political, economic, social 
and cultural benefits as well as to take responsibilities equally…a 
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society where men and women can jointly participate in activities 
according to their individual characteristics, without being restricted 
by “gender”, a social and cultural construct (Vision of Gender 
Equality, Part 1, Point 1.1).  
 
Moreover, in order to achieve such an outcome of “gender neutrality” (in this case, 
where the act of being either a man or a women has no bearing on available choices or 
opportunity in every aspect of social involvement) the Vision of Gender Equality 
states as one of its primary goals: 
 
[T]o adjust the conditions of society which will enable men and 
women to participate as equal members in not just the family and 
workplace, but in every field of society…it is necessary to review 
those systems and customs based on stereotyped gender roles, from 
the viewpoint of gender equality…it is necessary to change the 
family-oriented views underlying those systems and customs into the 
individual-oriented views, and to establish frameworks of society 
which will neutrally apply to every citizen, whatever life style each 
individual may chose (Vision of Gender Equality, Part 2, Point 1.1). 
 
In order to achieve such ends, the Vision of Gender Equality report outlines five key 
recommendations as part of its reform programme, outlined below: 
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Table 5. The Reform Programme for the Vision of Gender Equality 
1. Forming a society with no gender-related prejudice 
(1) Revision of systems and customs which might lead to gender-related 
prejudice 
(2) The construction of a social system where men and women have an equal 
share of paid and unpaid work 
(3) Making a social infrastructure from the standpoint of socially-oriented 
people 
2. Establishing gender equality in the workplace, family and community 
(1) Equal opportunity and equal treatment at the workplace 
(2) Promotion of gender equality in agriculture, forestry, fisheries, and self-
employed businesses 
(3) Promotion of gender equality in the ageing society 
3. Promotion of joint participation by men and women in policy decision-making 
(1) Promoting the participation by men and women in policy decision-making 
processes 
(2) Studying the measures of “positive actions”  
4. Reinforcing efforts to promote/protect the right to live without discrimination by 
gender 
(1) Elimination of violence against women 
(2) Promoting/protecting human rights in the media 
(3) Establishing reproductive health/rights 
(4) Promotion of gender equality to open the way for a diversity of choices 
through enrichment of education and learning 
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5. Contributing to the “Equality, Development, and Peace” of the Global Community 
(1) Infiltrating international norms and standards in Japan 
(2) Contributing towards “Equality, Development and Peace” 
 
Source: The Vision of Gender Equality, Part 2 
  
The rhetoric of the reform language is to refashion the basic social principles 
underpinning the existing normatively ingrained gender relations fabric – group 
obligations and responsibilities above the individual, in exchange for paternal 
patronage under the corporate protective umbrella – and precipitate the decline of the 
daikokubashira/ryosai kenbo normative path in preference for a more open “gender 
equal” structure that is not marred by gender biases. The principles of the Vision of 
Gender Equality purports that the removal of gender constraints is not only a moral 
imperative, but also essential to the long-term efficiency of social functioning in Japan 
(Osawa 2000, p.8).  
 
 Despite the emergency manifest in the language of the Vision of Gender 
Equality, little supporting policies have been passed and hence current results have 
been limited, leading to a questioning of the government’s actual commitment 
towards such profound reform. In an assessment of the monetary, legislative and 
policy contributions of Hashimoto and subsequent administrations to the Vision of 
Gender Equality reform, Osawa argues that state commitment for said reform is 
constrained by their general fiscal imperatives – to either have tight or loose budget 
balances – and hence the grand goal of gender-equality is secondary to broader 
macroeconomic imperatives (Osawa 2000). Moreover, the White Paper on Gender 
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Equality 2007 (available at http://www.gender.go.jp/whitepaper/ewp2007.pdf) 
indicates that traditional gender norms concerning appropriate gender roles are still 
prevalent. The ongoing expansion of female labour force representation, especially in 
non-regular forms of employment, has not developed with a corresponding change in 
social attitudes as women are still seen as the primary caregivers (eg. the percentage 
of those who take a childcare leave amoung all women who give birth during their 
career and amoung all men whose spouses give birth is 72.3 percent for women and 
0.5 percent for men; quoted in the White Paper on Gender Equality 2007, p.27). 
Therefore, the 1990s has seen a general expansion of Japanese women’s burden in the 
public and private sphere, and hence further entrenchment of hegemonic gender 
identities, not the challenge of fundamental gender norms as hoped by the Vision of 
Gender Equality reform. This position is further supported when investigating the 
broader legislative context concerning women and employment.  
 
 
The Legal Framework for Gender Equality  
 
 Subsequent to the end of the Second World War, the first general law 
regulating employment relations was passed in 1947 under the Labour Standards Law. 
The Labour Standards Law covers such subjects as employment contracts, payment of 
wages, working hours, rest days, annual paid leave, protection of children and 
pregnant women, and workers’ compensation etc. (Yamakawa 2001, p.632). This 
legislation was revised in 1998, and amendments enacted in April 1999, to set more 
stringent regulations concerning the amount of overtime work for female workers 
responsible for the care of dependents (including children and/or extended family 
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members), should they request shorter overtime hours for caregiving responsibilities 
(Kumamoto-Healey 2005, p.462). However, the Labour Standards Law ensures for 
the provision of basic standards in employment irrespective of sex and as such cannot 
be called upon to legislate against specific instances of gender discrimination in 
labour relations. Of more specific relevance for women’s employment rights in the 
post war era is the Equal Employment Opportunity Law (EEOL) of 1985 (amended in 
1997), the Child Care Leave Law (CCLL) of 1991 (revised in 1995 and renamed the 
Child Care and Family Care Leave Law [CCFCLL]), and the Part-time Work Law 
(PTWL) in 1993.  
 
It is arguable that the Vision of Gender Equality represents a continuity in the 
Japanese state’s efforts to manage the existing gender order with the interests of 
capital. Seemingly progressive for gender equality, this legislation actually further 
entrenches workplace inequality and the status of women as periphery workers 
without addressing the cleavages in the rights of part-time workers (of which women 
are over represented) versus full-time workers. The superficial attempts made by the 
government to revise and enact legislation regulating women’s employment is a 
strategy to promote the “family friendly” face of the state in support of the stated 
objectives of the Vision of Gender Equality policy, without profound long-term 
commitment towards developing a gender neutral society. The end objective is not to 
challenge or supplant the status quo gender norm structure, to revise traditional 
cultural values concerning gender roles and create a gender equal society, but to alter 
women’s perceptions of their available choices and opportunities so that reproduction 
becomes more viable and attractive in the current environment of declining fertility. 
Hence the state remains committed to perpetuating the accepted gender norm 
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dynamics of the hegemonic masculine daikokubashira archetype and complementary 
feminine ryosai keno identity exalted under the current gender regime. 
 
 
The Equal Employment Opportunity Law (EEOL) 
The Law on Securing, Etc. of Equal Opportunity and Treatment between Men 
and Women in Employment, commonly referred to as the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Law (EEOL) of 1985, was enacted to ratify the Japanese government’s 
commitment towards the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), which was ratified by Japan in 1985 
(for a discussion on CEDAW and the impact of global gender mainstreaming on 
national gender relations policy see Zwingel 2005; and True 2003). The EEOL is the 
basic statute of equal opportunity between men and women in employment. Where 
the Labour Standards Law only regulates equality in employment between the sexes 
with respect to wages (Yamakawa 2001, p.636), the original EEOL encouraged (but 
did not compel) employer’s from discriminatory actions against women in terms of: i) 
recruitment and hiring; ii) assignment and promotion; iii) training; iv) fringe benefits; 
and v) mandatory retirement age, resignation, and dismissal (EEOL, available at 
http://www.jil.go.jp/english/laborinfo/library/documents/llj_law4.pdf).   
 
 At its inception, the EEOL was heavily criticised for its encouragement 
provisions (“duty to endeavour”) and its ineffective provision of a dispute resolution 
process (Knapp 1995). The 1985 EEOL failed to “prohibit” the actions it was enacted 
to legislate against due to the absence of any penalties for non-compliance. Moreover, 
the 1985 EEOL has been attributed for the formal institutionalisation of the two-track 
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employment system, which reinforced a lifetime managerial employment programme 
for men and a menial non-progressive administrative employment path for women 
(Kumamoto-Healey 2005, p.464; Gelb 2003, p.52; and Molony 1995, p.292). In 
reaction to the “moral duties” clause of the new legislation, employers circumvented 
the legislation by reforming the language of the longstanding practice of sex-
segregated two-track hiring and work system which discriminated against the course 
of employment between the sexes according to the “career-track” for men and the 
“mommy-track” for women – now referred to in gender-neutral terms as the 
“managerial track” and the “general/clerical track”. This revision in recruitment 
language allowed employers to maintain the perception that they were upholding the 
spirit of the EEOL whilst transferring the onus of gender-equality to women who 
“choose” their career path in line with their domestic duties. Thus, the 1985 EEOL 
was inadequate in providing an impetus for a gender-equal society as its ineffective 
language had the opposite effect of encouraging “motherhood” protection at the firm 
level through the institutionalisation of the two-track employment practice. Moreover, 
the 1985 EEOL provided for legal reinforcement and state legitimacy of the 
daikokubashira/ryosai kenbo gender norm structure, which sough to neutralise 
defections to the gender norm structure. 
 
 In light of these inefficiencies, the EEOL was revised in 1997 to reinforce 
prohibition against “discrimination on the basis of sex,” including indirect 
discrimination, and child-rearing related forms of discrimination (Nakakubo 2007) to 
greater reinforce provisions for a gender-equal society. The new legislation clearly 
prohibits discrimination against men and women in respect to recruitment, hiring, 
assignment and promotion, whereas the 1985 EEOL had only obliged employers to 
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“endeavour to provide” equal opportunity (see Chapter 2, Articles 5 and 6). Moreover, 
the 1997 revisions stipulate that discrimination shall not be made on the basis of sex, 
not just against women. In light of this fact, the progressive developments of the 1997 
EEOL are seen as a greater commitment towards a gender-equal society in support of 
the Vision of Gender Equality objectives.  
 
However, whilst the 1997 EEOL has addressed some of the existing 
discrepancies between the employment rights of men and women in regular 
employment, it has not addressed discrimination between the sexes within differing 
types of employment. In 1985, 68.1 percent of all employed women held regular full-
time positions. This figure has consistently shown a downward trend over the last 
decade to now figure at 47.3 percent of all employed women (White Paper on Gender 
Equality 2007, p.24). The 1997 EEOL does not address gender equality with respect 
to employment status and as such, in this era of increasing feminisation of non-regular 
modes of employment, its relevancy for challenging the status quo of entrenched 
gender norms will continue to be diminished. 
 
 
The Child Care and Family Care Leave Law (CCFCLL)  
The CCLL of 1991 was enacted to give entitlement to a worker irrespective of 
sex to take leave to care for a child less than one year of age (comparable to maternity 
leave in western nations). Under revisions in 1995, this law was renamed the 
CCFCLL to greater reflect the difficulty in harmonising family life and working life 
with the problems of an ageing society and the social onus for care of the elderly on 
family members (traditionally the daughter in law, under a three-generation household 
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with the husband’s parents as additional “dependents”). The amended statute provides 
for leave to be granted to any employee (with the exception of day labourers or those 
employed under fixed-term contracts) who requests such leave of absence to care for 
either a child under the age of one or a family member (CCFCLL, available at 
http://www.jiwe.or.jp/english/law/ law4_1_1.html). Provisions include that: i) persons 
undertaking such leave application be employed by the employer for a continuous 
period of at least one year; and ii) it is likely that the employee will continue at the 
place of employment at the end of their leave period (Articles 5 and 11). The law 
stipulates that an employer cannot refuse a submission for child care leave or family 
care leave (Articles 6 and 12), or dismiss or treat an employee disadvantageously for 
making such leave applications (Articles 10 and 16). Moreover, the CCFCLL does not 
require the employer to make any monetary payments to employees applying for such 
leave in their period of absence (Kumamoto-Healey 2005, p.465). 
 
The provision that employers are not legally obliged to monetarily support 
employers in their applications for child care and family care leave is significant in 
determining the matrix of economic opportunity loss with respect to who takes leave. 
Considering that 82.2 percent of Japanese men are in stable and regular employment 
(White Paper on Gender Equality 2007, p.24), it is reasonable to assume that despite 
the gender indiscriminate nature of the language of the CCFCLL, it is more 
economically efficient for men to remain in continuous employment and for their 
female spouses to assume the primary care giver responsibility due to their relatively 
lower wages and less stable employment status. Indeed, this is statistically supported 
as previously mentioned with only 0.5 percent of men taking childcare leave. 
Moreover, Japanese men perform only 12.5 percent of total housework in double-
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income families, which greatly reflects the internal division of labour in Japanese 
households with women as the primary care givers (White Paper on Gender Equality 
2007, p.14). The CCFCLL does not address the core values of Japanese society in 
respect to gender roles, as stringent employment expectations have remained stable 
amoung employers (eg. Japanese men work an average of 46.5 hours per week and 
women work an average of 35.1 hours per week which is one of the highest in OECD 
countries) (White Paper on Gender Equality 2007, p. 15), which is not conducive to 
greater work/life balance for women and hence does not allow for any profound 
changes in the division of labour in the workplace. Again, the CCFCLL is another 
piece of legislation which illustrates the state’s positioning of state protection of 
“motherhood” above “worker” identities for women, and hence perpetuation of the 
daikokubashira/ryosai kenbo gender order.  
 
This positioning is further supported with respect to the Child Allowance 
System, which awards a monetary “baby bonus” to women for bearing children. The 
Child Allowance programme encourages women to start bearing children in light of 
the below replacement level birth rate. As of April 2007, the government doubled its 
monetary commitment to this scheme (the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare 
available at http://www.mhlw.go.jp/english/topics/child-support/index.html). The 
state now awards 10,000 yen per month per child paid for the first and second child 
under the age of three to the end of elementary schooling. In addition, the 
commitment for the provision of 10,000 yen per month for third and additional 
children up until the end of elementary schooling remains effective and unchanged.  
Furthermore, the Child Allowance scheme stipulates that the allowance will not be 
paid to parents or guardians whose combined income for the previous year exceeds 
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the income ceiling threshold for their income bracket (see the Ministry of Health, 
Labour and Welfare website for further details).  
 
The nature of the policy is such that it encourages women to adhere to the 
ryosai kenbo normative path vis-à-vis an economic incentive. Within the context of 
the rigid Japanese employment system, women who exit the labour market for child 
rearing purposes “choose” to become periphery workers as their post-natal child 
rearing and household responsibilities effectively make them ineligible to re-enter the 
labour market as regular employees with full employment status, responsibilities and 
rights (as reflected in the “M-shaped” employment curve for women’s employment 
participation) (see Imada and Ikeda 2007). These circumstances are further reinforced 
by the income ceiling stipulation of the Child Allowance policy which coupled with 
tax incentives aforementioned in the previous chapter, again limits women’s 
employment choices through encouraging women to deliberately maintain their 
annual salary below a given level (albeit, that of a supplementary income earner) in 
order to receive such company and state incentives. The outcome for such legislation 
and state policy is that the objectives of the Vision of Gender Equality with true 
gender-neutral roles are negated, and women’s roles as mothers and wives are further 
entrenched in covert support of traditional gender norm dynamics.  
 
 
The Part-time Worker’s Law (PTWL) 
The Law Concerning the Improvement of Employment Management, Etc. of 
Part-time Workers, known as the Part-time Work Law (PTWL), defines part-time 
employees as those “whose prescribed weekly hours are less than those of regular 
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employees employed at the same establishment” (Chapter 1, Article 2; available at 
http://www.jiwe.or.jp/english/law/law3_1_1.html). The law encourages (but does not 
legally obligate) employers to “promote the effective utilization of the actual work 
conditions of Part-Time Workers concerned, and maintain balance with regular 
workers by securing proper working conditions” (Chapter 1, Article 3) through 
effective measures to secure their proper working conditions and management. 
Moreover, the PTWL stipulates that employer’s should “endeavour” to clarify the 
working conditions of part-time employees through prompt documentation upon 
hiring outlining the nature of their employment contract in regards to working hours 
and working conditions (Chapter 3, Article 6). As mentioned, the PTWL does not 
stipulate any penal provisions for employers who are in violation of its content, but 
acts as a legal guideline for employers to improve the management of part-time 
employees, especially in respect to assigning supervision (see Chapter 3, Article 9) 
and compelling the Minister of Labour, employer organisations and government 
organisations to provide relevant advice and guidance to encourage employers to 
invest in the further education and training of their part-time personnel (see Chapter 3, 
Article 11).  
 
The PTWL is marred with similar limitations as the 1985 EEOL in terms of 
lack of enforcement ability, and a dispute resolution process (see Braodbent 2001 and 
2003). Moreover, the fluid definition of part-time workers prescribed by the statute as 
those “whose weekly hours are less than those of regular employees employed by the 
same establishment” has resulted in increasing room for the exploitation of part-time 
employees with respect to their employment rights. It has been noted that an 
overwhelming majority of part-time workers in Japan work similar hours to that of 
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their regular employee counterparts (eg. “part-time” employees at Maruko Keihoki 
work only 15 minutes less than “full-time” workers each day, and “part-time” workers 
at Azumi lingerie company work only one hour behind their “full-time” colleagues; 
quoted in Broadbent 2003, p.63), and perform the same or similar duties and 
responsibilities albeit with less working rights in terms of leave loading, additional 
allowances, job training, working conditions, and career succession (see Nakamura 
2007 in the Japan Times available at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-
bin/nn20070405fl.html).  
 
The inefficiency of the PTWL to realistically reflect the current employment 
conditions of part-time workers further limits its ability to address and ensure the 
relative welfare of part-time workers, and hence leads to a questioning of its role in 
state management of gender relations with respect to the workplace. It is evident that 
the PTWL is a gendered strategy to encourage women into non-regular employment 
status in an effort to cater to business needs of lower internal labour costs and greater 
labour flexibility. The end objective of which is not to unequivocally deliver on the 
promise of the Vision of Gender Equality in a bid to transplant the existing hegemonic 
gender norm dynamic for a gender-neutral alternative, but to ensure the longevity and 
viability of the vestiges of the lifetime employment system for men in support of the 
centrality of the daikokubashira hegemonic masculine norm.  
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Summary 
 
The daikokubashira centred normative structure defined through corporate 
imperatives has become so internalised such that Japanese state policy and positive 
law on gender equality and employment is framed in compromise to the structures 
that ensure the longevity of the prevailing gender regime. The Japanese state is under 
domestic pressure by Japanese women (via the declining birth rate) to engage in the 
discourse on gender neutrality as exemplified by the Vision of Gender Equality, 
however must formulate such perceived commitments so that it does not profoundly 
impede upon current gender norm dynamics. The limited scope of employment 
legislation including the EEOL, the CCFCLL and PTWL in reflecting the growing 
needs of women’s work rights under current employment practices in non-regular 
work is incongruent with the language for gender equality in the Vision of Gender 
Equality (the government’s primary statement on gender equality). The implication of 
which is that the state remains committed to preserving the current gender regime and 
has deliberately failed to address limitations in employment legislature in an effort to 
neutralise individual Japanese women’s challenge through the framing of women as 
the primary care givers in reinforcement of ryosai kenbo ideology. The gender regime 
with the daikokubashira as central is not in decline but remains entrenched and 
exalted by corporate norm entrepreneurs and state support.  
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Conclusion 
 
In addressing the question, “How have practices in women’s work redefined 
the nature of the gender regime in contemporary Japan?” a social theory of gender and 
feminist constructivist conceptual framework premised on the norm life cycle model 
of Finnemore and Sikkink was employed. The findings suggest that increased access 
to the labour market for women would seemingly provide women with greater 
economic autonomy, and indicate that women are renouncing their traditional gender 
normative path from within. However, business groups in their role as norm 
entrepreneurs have established strategies to negate these challenges to ensure the 
continual reproduction of lifetime employment and seniority wage privileges for their 
daikokubashira core workforce. This framing of non-regular employment as 
progressive for gender equality has been a conscious strategy on the part of business 
to neutralise the challenges to the hegemonic gender order status quo that developed 
in the 1990s. However, regular modes of employment with full worker rights have not 
been offered to women making part-time work a gendered strategy. Moreover, 
 
 [t]hose who engage in full-time employment are often seen to have 
legitimacy to approach the state as citizens with demands. Those who 
are engaged in part-time work or domestic labour, or who are in 
receipt of welfare benefits, do not share such legitimacy. (Mackie 
1994, p.35) 
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The effect of gendering part-time work for women has been the further entrenchment 
of the ryosai kenbo ideology, not the redefinition of gender norms for the betterment 
of gender neutrality.  
 
In addition, the government in support of corporate activities, has also adopted 
this framing of non-regular employment for women as being conducive for gender 
equality, albeit with the objective of protecting the longevity of the 
daikokubashira/ryosai kenbo gender regime. The Japanese government has failed to 
support its commitment to gender equality as espoused in the Vision of Gender 
Equality with accompanying policy and legislative reform. Rather, existing and 
amended legislation is limited in its employment protections for women, effectively 
institutionalising women’s identity as mothers and wives before that of workers and 
citizens. Consequently, the Japanese government has placed macroeconomic 
objectives such as economic recovery and fertility improvement above concerns for 
gender neutrality and in doing so has legitimised business efforts to neutralise and co-
opt this period of “challenge” of the gender order so that continuity in hegemonic 
gender relations is ensured. At present, the gender regime in Japan remains 
characterised by the centrality of the daikokubashira hegemonic masculinity ideal to 
which all other subordinate masculinities and feminities are defined. This continuity 
in gender norm dynamics in spite of exogenous economic challenges and challenges 
from within the gender order is testament to the pervasiveness of gender identity 
ideology in ordering the pattern of gender relations in Japan. 
 
Whilst the current period under consideration has not indicated any deviation 
from the daikokubashira centred gender regime, it has been alluded that the following 
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generation of sarariimen may provide further challenge to business and state support 
of traditional gender relations.  As mentioned, in light of the economic recession, 
businesses engage in a sequence of labour adjustment strategies that are designed to 
have minimal impact on their internal labour market and allow them to ensure the 
vestiges of lifetime employment and seniority wages for their core (male) workforce. 
Within that sequence of labour adjustment strategies, the most stringent course short 
of dismissal is new hiring freezes to which the next cohorts of sarariimen have been 
most affected. It would be interesting to briefly consider employment strategy impacts 
on the next generation of corporate warriors in light of the prospective outlook for the 
gender order equilibrium. 
 
 
“Freeters”: Young Atypical Workers and Jobless Youth in Japan 
 
“Freeter” is a term adopted from the English word “free” and German 
“arbeiter”, meaning worker and refers to young non-regular workers aged who have 
chosen arubaito (casual employment) or part-time work over regular employment 
commitments in rejection of the corporate mould. Depending on labour market and 
employment definitions, the estimated total number of freeters ranges from two 
million to more than four million (Honda 2005; Kosugi 2004). The latter criteria 
incorporates a broader definition to include unemployed youths who are searching for 
work without success and those who have withdrawn from the labour market because 
they have given up job hunting.  
 
Lillian Mai 
Women and Work in Contemporary Japan: Deconstructing the “Crisis” of the Gender Order 
 
- 80 -  
Table 6 Changes in the ratio of youth engaged in part-time jobs, temporary jobs 
and other non-regular employment 
  Men  Women 
 
Age 15-25 (excluding 
students) Age 25-34 
Age 15-25 (excluding 
students) Age 25-34 
  
Part time/ 
temporary 
Other non 
regular 
employment 
Part time/ 
temporary
Other non 
regular 
employment
Part time/ 
temporary
Other non 
regular 
employment
Part time/ 
temporary 
Other non 
regular 
employment
1991 7.0 1.0 1.3 1.5 8.6 2.2 22.1 3.2 
1996 8.7 1.3 2.6 1.5 15.8 2.3 23.4 2.6 
2001 18.1 2.3 5.4 1.8 24.9 3.9 27.3 7.4 
         
 
Source: Adapted from Kosugi 2002, table 1, p.7 
 
As table 6 illustrates, whilst non-regular employment rates have traditionally been 
higher for women irrespective of age, the rate of non-regular employment for both 
men and women has risen considerably over the 1990s. The percentage of part-time 
and temporary workers 25 years old and younger is increasing sharply for both men 
and women, reaching 18.1 percent for men and 24.9 percent for women and in 2001. 
For the 25 to 34 age bracket, while disparities between men and women in non-
regular employment have traditionally been large, both numbers increased in the latter 
half of the 1990s. It can be discerned that the number of part-time and temporary-job 
workers in the 25 year old and younger category is rising sharply for both men and 
women, with that trend also evident with those in their late 20s. That is, male Japanese 
youths are catching up to their female counterparts in assuming non-regular, auxiliary 
worker and citizenship identity. This is the most alarming indication that the gendered 
path from High School to University in the creation of sarariimen is in decline. 
 
It has commonly be noted that changes in labour demand of graduates from 
businesses has been the primary factor explaining the increase in the non-regular 
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employment rate amoung young people and the increase in non-regular employees at 
the expense of regular employees generally. (Hori 2007; Honda 2004; Inui 2003; and 
Genda 2000). In 1992, the number of new graduate recruitment was 1.67 million, 
which declined to 220,000 in 2003 (Kosugi 2004, p.53). The school-to-work system in 
Japan has traditionally provided the main mechanism through which youths find 
regular employment. Under this system, Japanese high schools receive graduate job 
application notices from local employers as required by the Employment Security 
Law 1947 (amended in 1949). They then engage with counselling of their students 
and recommend which employers to apply for post-graduate positions. Typically, 
High Schools will recommend only one student for each opening, creating internal 
competition between students for the most desirable job. Moreover, students are 
recommended for only one position at a time. If the students fails the application 
process then he or she must further consult with teachers to gain a recommendation 
for another job (Brinton 2000, p.291). The school-to-work system is highly predicated 
on longstanding social networks, or “institutional social capital” (to borrow the 
concept from Brinton) between employers and tertiary institutions (see Brinton 2000). 
The reduction in graduate recruitment places as a direct result of hiring freezes has 
resulted in a breakdown of this institutional social capital, which is the crucial initial 
process through which sarariimen are created.  
 
On the labour demand side, a survey conducted by the Japan Institute of 
Labour (2000) monitored high school students residing in metropolitan areas to 
discern the motivations leading students to become freeters. The survey found that 50 
percent of freeters wanted full-time employment but were obliged to resign their 
search when no job offers were made, which is supportive of the labour demand 
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reasoning. Of greater interest is the other half of freeters who had no clear direction of 
what they wanted to do post-graduation and opted for non-regular employment to 
avoid forced employment into the corporate normative path (Kosugi 2004, pp.57-60). 
This represents a shift in values of the generation under consideration for the 
avoidance of the roles and responsibilities traditionally defined as that of a full 
member of society in the Japanese context. As Genda argues, “the resulting 
unemployment of young people is a luxury unemployment that does not involve real 
financial necessity. To them, work is a discretionary pastime, or a means of earning 
pocket money” (Genda 2000; also see newspaper articles by Hoffman 2003; Cortazzi 
2001; Ashby 2000; and Naito 2000).  
 
Whether it is due to exogenous economic imperatives or fundamental shifts in 
social vales, Japanese youths (especially males) are increasingly seeking atypical 
forms of employment which is a marked deviation from the traditional gender 
normative path. Moreover, freeter employment is not a passing phase for young 
people until they can be incorporated into the regular job market. The Japanese 
cabinet office estimated that the number of freeters in their late 30s has tripled since 
1989 to figure at 800,000 in 2003 resulting from the limited vocational training 
opportunities associated with arubaito and pato (part-time) employment (quoted in 
Mori 2005, p.22). Considering that the promise of lifetime employment stability as the 
carrot for gender norm compliance is waning in importance for the next generation of 
reserve sarariimen it is pertinent to ask whether male youths represent a possible 
challenge from within for the future outlook of the Japanese gender regime. 
Moreover, it will be of interest to witness how women will respond to this “levelling” 
of gender identities as the hegemonic masculine ideal is increasingly renounced by the 
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next generation of males. However, it can be assumed that norm entrepreneurs 
(corporations) and the Japanese state will attempt to manage further normative 
deviations when economic circumstances will allow to create renewed legitimacy for 
the daikokubashira centred gender order.  
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